達賴訪台效應與ECFA的加速簽署
在台灣迫切想與大陸簽ＭＯＵ和ＥＣＦＡ的此際，卻因達賴訪台而重創紅藍雙方關係，民進黨雖在ＥＣＦＡ公投挫敗後，藉由達賴的訪台達到反中的效果，板回了早先的頹勢。兩岸不信任危機的升高，台灣內部咸認不利於ＭＯＵ和ＥＣＦＡ的簽署，尤其是當大陸已開始強勢主導兩岸關係發展。不過不信任危機的立即升高可以藉由事後讓步的表現來獲得糖吃，進而獲取一些原本無法從簽訂ＭＯＵ和ＥＣＦＡ所獲得的甜頭。北韓與伊朗的例子多到不在話下。鑒於北京宣稱會密切關注後續馬政府如何處理達賴喇嘛在台行程，因此馬政府應付達賴訪台的後續動作應該是未來ＥＣＦＡ加速簽署與否的關鍵契機。何以論斷北京會在加速簽署ＥＣＦＡ給予糖吃？
中共國台辦發言人的兩度警告，附加主任助理李亞飛的談話，可見大陸正對馬政府的後續處理態度靜觀其變。政經方面皆未對馬政府施重手，僅重砲攻擊民進黨，暫時將所有責任歸咎於民進黨。再者，迄今，金管會副主委李紀珠也未見到對方金融主管機關任何負面的反應。李亞飛的談話著眼於兩岸應儘快實現經濟關係正常化，推動雙邊經濟制度化，趁勢提醒台灣，在當前金融危機下，大陸對台灣經濟的重要性。大陸知道台灣有興趣的是經貿利益，言必稱經濟，甚至以達賴喇嘛訪台一事綁住兩岸兩會協商及兩岸經濟合作架構協議（ECFA）的簽訂。考量到馬政府有別於九個月前拒絕達賴一事，如今卻因挽救民意，不惜賭上剛上軌道的兩岸關係讓達賴訪台，馬政府的舉措雖讓大陸寒心，但北京的選項應是藉由政經手段協助馬政府扭轉台灣民意。大陸中方既對我方誘之以利，必先對正遭致政治土石流的馬政府施以援手，以政經甜頭挽救其大量流失中的民意，以期跟邀請達賴訪台與提議ＥＣＦＡ公投的民進黨做區別。以此推斷，馬政府的補破網行動定會對加速簽署ＥＣＦＡ帶來莫大影響。
2009年8月31日 星期一
National interest and Sino-EU Textile Dispute
National Interest and Sino-EU Textile Dispute- Italian role
Meng-jen Chang[1]
Abstract
“Bras war” took place in 2005 and is terminated in October 2007. What the interesting point was that this event divided EU Member States into two parts (in favor or against quotas towards China). Italy involved in this crisis was one of most influential countries being eager to impose the safeguards on China. The Sino-EU trade dispute occurred because of the Italian mobilization to defend the interest of the European textile producers. The case study that Italy tended to transfer its national interest to international negotiation table brought us a clear-cut picture in which domestic affairs influence international negotiation. When governments met in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Here, again we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic negotiation by observing the Italian role within the EU.
Keywords: Bras War, Sino-EU Textile dispute, Italy, three-level game
國內利益與歐中紡織貿易衝突-義大利角色
摘要
歐中內衣大戰緣起於2005年中旬，於2007年十月真正落幕，肇因世貿組織架構下的紡織與服裝條約的終止。事件的發生，著實造成歐盟內部成員國分裂，一派支持設限；另一派則持自由貿易口號。歐中紡織紛爭中，鑑於義大利擁有最大的紡織工業，為了國家利益，義大利是強烈要求對中成衣設限的會員國。貿易紛爭的發生最大原因歸咎於義大利藉宣稱捍衛歐洲紡織市場與代表歐盟紡織業者的利益，進行內部廣泛的動員與跨國結盟，迫使主張自由貿易派失利以及歐中紡織糾紛的加劇。歐中紡織紛爭的案例可看出歐盟會員國政府在國際談判桌上的動作，反應出其國內利益的考量，本文借觀察義大利在歐盟的角色來分析內部因素在國際經濟談判的重要性。
關鍵詞： 內衣大戰、歐中紡織紛爭、義大利，三層次賽局
Introduction
The major subject of this paper is the observation of Italian reaction to protect the European textile and clothing industry as European import quotas was capped on Chinese textiles and clothing goods in 2005-2007. The political drama regarding the “bras war” became a spotlight and thus a host of international media paid attention on this event.[2] Although Sino-EU textile row took place in 2005 it indeed drop the curtain in October 2007.
Drawing on the three-level game approach, this research aims at figuring out the Italian influence on so-called event. How and to what extent did the Italy influence and participate in the EU trade policy decision-making? Do domestic factors matter in the international negotiations? Do national interest affect the outcome of trade negotiations?
A brief review of the literature with respect to the links of domestic politics to international negotiations will be discussed in the following section. After an overview of literature, the next part will mention about the evolution of Sino-EU textile dispute (2005-2007) and then next step is to explore the domestic factors in terms of Italian mobilization that affect the EU’s trade policy towards China.
This paper, through an examination of Sino-EU trade disputes, offers an explanation about how the domestic politics influence the outcome of international negotiation. Since there are neither sufficient data and expertise nor space to cover all the 25 EU Member States in this contribution, the following analysis will focus principally on one of pivotal players of the third-level game, that of Italy. This is not to suggest that Italy constitutes the crucial player among the EU Member States to decide on the relationships with China. Apart from the major players France and Spain, there are also several Member States like Scandinavian countries who particularly play counterparts within the EU towards Chinese textile products. The role choice of Italy pivots on its biggest textile industry, fierce reaction and on its pioneer of lobbying the European Commission.[3] In addition, the negotiation outcome has been seemed to the victory of trade protectionism within the EU. It is worthy digging out the Italian influence in this event because of above reasons. The paper concludes that the three-level game will bring clear-cut process of the EU decision-making in which Italy promoted its national interest to the European level by aligning other EU Member States of South Europe and Central-East Europe. The final goal of the analysis is to assess the mobilization of interest groups in Italy and the role and performance of the Italian government in a European policy field against China during three periods of Sino-EU negotiations.
Analytical Framework: the Three-level Game, the link of Domestic Politics and International Negotiation
Most theories of international relations neglect the influence of domestic politics because they consider the state as a unitary actor. A growing literature on International factors can matter international negotiation, but what lacks is a theory of domestic influences, especially there is a dearth of their interaction with international factors. A growing literature on endogenous policy formation treats interest groups as participant in a competition for political favors. For the analyst of international negotiation, they have noted that the existence of domestic differences. On the contrary, from the realist school’s point of view, the better understanding of international relations and international negotiations is to dig out the interplay of unitary, rational and national actors, who pursue their maximized self-interest.
Although Neo-realism admits that domestic politics is not very important to explain significant foreign policy decisions or international political outcomes a slew of recent researches on the international relations field advances the proposition that domestic politics is typically a centerpiece of the explanation for states’ foreign policies.[4] A systemic theory depicts states as unitary, rational actors, rather a domestic-political explanation treats one state as non-unitary, and which pursues a sub-optimal foreign policy because of the interaction of the actors represented within the state. Differences among states in their internal preferences and political institutions have important effects on international politics. Moreover, domestic political interactions lead to diverse state foreign policy practices. As a consequence, Waltz admits that neo-realist theory of international politics can’t be a theory of foreign policy.[5] Milner also spoke up that states are not unitary actors; that is, they are composed of actors with varying preferences who share power over decision-making.[6] International politics and foreign policy become parts of the domestic struggle for power and the search for internal compromise. How do domestic politics matter? Great deal of literatures on political economy indicates that domestic politics connect deeply with international trade negotiations.[7] Large numbers of literatures about two-level games initiated by Putnam are eager to answer this abovementioned question.[8] However, due to particular status of the EU two-level games theory seems to be unfit to be put on the EU. Instead, three-level game extended by two-level game can depict how Italian-led position can be transferred to European level and to the international negotiation table.
The background of Sino-EU trade row on textile
Like European T&C sector had predicted, following the final stage of liberalization on January 1 2005, textile and clothing exports to Europe from China experienced a rapid upsurge and sharply drops in unit prices. Some categories of imports increased in a matter of months were 100% or more. On 14 March European Textile and Apparel Association (Euratex) first asked EU and 25 Member States to take the safeguard with regard to 12 categories of imported Chinese textile products. European producers together pushed the Commission to take a tough stand in a way that EU should use the safeguard against China in order to protect their interest. 13 Member States urged to curb Chinese garments by any safeguard measures as soon as possible.
Indeed, the investigation revealed a dramatic deterioration of production and employment in the European T&C sector in some kind of categories.[9] EU Member States likely to lose its advantage would be the Central and Eastern European countries, which benefit from tariff-free access.
On 17 May 2005, Peter Mandelson launched formal consultations with China for two of the nine categories of textile imports i.e. T-shirts and flax yarns after trade data revealed significant increases (ranging between 51% and 534 %) in Chinese imports. A formal request for consultations was made on 27 May 2005.
Meanwhile, the irate Chinese authorities were about to eliminate export tariffs on 81 categories from 1 June 2005 to show their rage in return. At moment the Sino-EU textile dispute was likely to escalate. As a result, rather than using the Textile Specific Safeguard Clause the EU and China reached an agreement that would cap Chinese imports at agreed levels each year until 2008. This agreement covers 10 product categories that will be restricted to a certain rate of imports, while allowing for an average growth in exports from China to Europe.[10] These annual allowances would be subject to an annual increase from 8% to 12.5% in ten categories of textiles quotas EU investigated. This would allow Chinese exports to continue to grow, but at a rate that would allow EU producers to adjust their structure.[11] Basically, this agreement was agreed upon that China would limit its export growth to the EU for a period of 3 years from 2005 to the end of 2007.
However, by the end of August, the difficulties of the shipment have emerged because China has already exceeded its 2005 export quotas for sweaters and men’s trousers, two of the 10 categories covered by a China-EU textiles agreement signed in last June. The stockpile for sweaters has reached 55m items, seven out of ten categories of textiles quotas were already reached alarming levels, blocking whopping stocks of garments in European ports, and stirring once again angry reactions from EU distributors (most from the north Europe).[12]
Textile-producer Member States such as South Europe and Central-East Europe obviously insisted that any quota increase for 2005 needed to be included into the quotas of 2006 and 2007 in order to maintain the sum of quotas granted by the Shanghai agreement until 2008. On the contrary, Northern Europe supported the increase in Chinese textile import ceilings for 2005 and leaved quotas for the following years unchanged.
Mandelson cannot help but renegotiate with China in order to meet the need of the opposite lobbies and get out of gridlock. On September 5, he came to terms with Chinese commerce minister, letting in the 88 million items (valued at around 600 million dollars) blocked at the EU borders, and including half of these stocks in China’s 2006 quota and in unfilled quotas of other textile products for 2005.
Double-Checking System replaced quotas using (Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing) (2007/10)
Those products covered by the agreement with China have increased more slowly thanks to ‘Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing. European textile-producer countries temporarily got a breath time. During this transitional period, the Commission under the Italian-led producer member states’ proposal supported European companies like Prada and Gucci to fight against the Chinese counterfeit. The Commission has also backed the idea of an Origin Marking system proposed by Italy for certain products including textiles that would require imported textiles to carry an origin label in which let consumers know what clothes they buy. The fears still remain that a trade war is likely to be triggered over textile issues by the expiry of textile quotas by the end of 2007. France, Italy and Spain supported the proposal proposed by Euratex to extend the period of quota for one year, however Northern Europe ruled out this idea and counterpart, China as well.
New agreement was reached in October of 2007 by imposing no restrictions on imports, but both sides were committed to cooperating to ensure a smooth transition. The Commission worked out new idea and proposed China a double-checking surveillance system for 2008 that would cover eight textiles product categories with particular sensitivities to replace quotas applied against China.[13] The benefit from this system is to call off the quotas but set condition for China in which allows EU to monitor textile import patterns, by which imports have to be licensed before they leave the dock in China and allows EU to see in advance likely developments. At the beginning, China rejected this proposal initiated by the Commission. China accepted this proposal after it had pondered on this measure over and over.
Domestic Factors of EU Member States: Italy as a leading competing trade structure country with China
Why Italy had fierce reaction about the restrictions on Chinese garments? It at first should be mentioned about T&C sector in Italy. Obviously, Italy keeps its strong leadership in terms of its contribution to total T&C employment and is by far the most prominent location for this industry.[14] This prominence is particularly remarkable in the clothing sub-sector where Italy accounts for close to 40% of EU production.[15] In each of the three sub-sectors within the textiles, clothing and leather manufacturing sector, Italy was one of the principal manufacturing Member States both in terms of value added and employment. A little over one third (34.1 %) of the value added generated by the textiles, clothing and leather manufacturing sector as a whole in the EU-25 came from Italy in 2003 (EUR 22.5 billion) (see Table 1).
Table 1 Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products (NACE Subsections DB and DC) Value added and employment: ranking of the top 5 Member States, 2003
Rank
Highest value added (EUR million) (1)
Share in EU-25 value added
(%) (1)
Highest number of persons employed (thousands) (2)
Share in EU-25 employment
(%) (2)
Highest share of national industrial value added
(%) (3)
Highest share of national industrial employment
(%) (4)
1
Italy (22 479.8)
34.1
Italy (757.5)
25.2
Portugal (14.9)
Portugal (30.8)
2
France (8247.0)
12.5
Poland (298.9)
10.0
Lithuania (11.4)
Lithuania (23.5)
3
Germany (8046.9)
12.2
Portugal (284.9)
9.5
Estonia (10.7)
Estonia (18.8)
4
Spain (6 695.6)
10.1
Spain (279.6)
9.3
Italy (10.1)
Italy (15.4)
5
United Kingdom (6481.3)
9.8
France (227.4)
7.6
Luxembourg (7.7)
Malta (14.9)
(1) Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Austria, not available.
(2) Sweden, provisional; Hungary, Malta and Slovakia, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Cyprus and Austria, not available.
(3) Slovakia and Sweden, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Austria, not available.
(4) Sweden, provisional; Hungary, Malta and Slovakia, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Austria, not available.
Source: Eurostat (SBS)
Textile sector is one of the core pillars of the Italian economy, but the vulnerable industry was quaking as the end of quota on Chinese imports took place.[16] The export of textiles and clothing contributes 10% in total Italian export. Italians are very proud of this traditional textile sector that created huge Italian export.[17] However, Italian textile manufacturers have been pressed hard by Chinese competition.
The incessant protests organized by uneasy employees brought about sharp strike in Italy that it drew an attention of all political parties and government who were involved this purely domestic account. Italian T&C sectors claimed that the quantity of Chinese garments obviously increased 449,5 percent from the January 2004 to January 2005, in particular the quantity of Chinese bra has arisen 25.2 per cent comparing to 2004-2005. According to the data of ISTAT (Istituto nazionale di statistica), the percentage of textiles and clothing goods imported from China arose 63,7% in February 2005 than last year. Imports of clothing went up 41,3%. Table 2 and table 3 indicated that China is a biggest imported source of textiles and clothing to Italy.
Table 2Value of Italian Import from key Market- Textile sector
2004
Weight%
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2006
Weight%
World
6.984
100
6.986
100
1.698
100
1.853
100
China
790
11,3
1.133
16,2
255
15
319
17,2
Germany
721
10,3
685
9,8
179
10,6
198
10,7
Turkey
495
7,1
518
7,4
135
7,9
149
8,1
France
493
7,1
440
6,3
116
6,9
111
6
Fonte: Elaborazione Osservatorio Economico Ministero Commercio Internazionale su dati ISTAT
Table 3 Value of Italian Import from key Market- Clothing sector
2004
Weight%
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2006
Weight%
World
7.553
100
8.191
100
2.194
100
2.530
100
China
1.520
20,1
1.952
23,8
443
20,2
546
21,6
Germany
1.035
13,7
973
11,9
262
11,9
253
10
Turkey
587
7,8
586
7,2
158
7,2
164
6,5
France
476
6,3
533
6,5
157
7,1
171
6,8
Fonte: Elaborazione Osservatorio Economico Ministero Commercio Internazionale su dati ISTAT
Mobilization of textiles-related associations
A great deal of relevant T&C associations and trade unions urged the forward step and measures of the EU to tackle with the EU enlargement in May of 2004 and removal of quota in 2005 since Italy had foreseen the calamity in its T&C sector before phase-out of ATC.[18]
On 21 February 2005, Confartigianato-Moda was the first warning that 100,000 jobs would be lost due to removal of quotas to Chinese textiles.[19] The Italian dominant textiles-Fashion sector, Smi-Ati (il Sistema Moda Italiana e l’Associazione Tessile Italiana, and then names Federazione Imprese Tessili e Moda Italiane)[20] and CNA (Confederazione Nazionale Dell’Artigianato e Della Piccola e Media Impresa) joined the line to call for emergent measures against flooded Chinese garments.
Femca Cisl, Filtea Cgil and Uilta-Uil are three major trade unions in Italy. In 2004 they hammered out some proposals about trade and industrial policy in order to tackle with the growing unemployment and dislocation in T&C sector.[21] Owing to phase-out of ATC job loss in Italian T&C sector was getting worse. Some companies like Marzotto SpA, owner of the Hugo Boss label, Gucci, Cavalli, Fendi held a strong manifestation in Prato called by three trade unions and guided by general sectary of Cisl Savino Pezzotta in 8 March of 2005. The aim was to push the pressure on Italian government to take the decision on anti-dumping measure on Chinese goods and also protest for de-localization of Italian textile industry.
Giovanni Nenciarini, president of Confartigianato di Prato and Carlo Longo, president of Prato Industrial Union pointed out the difficulty of failing to face the Chinese challenge that 74 % of their companies had less than 5 employees and they lost 5,000 employees of textile sector in two years. Badly, the export dropped from 3.300 million of euro of 2001 to 2.577 of 2003.[22] Valeria Fedeli, European Trades Union Federation: Textiles, Clothing and Leather and General Sectary of Italian trade union (Filtea Cgil) on the side of producers had called for the intervention from Italian government to curb the job loss in T&C sector.[23] Luca Rinfreschi, president of Chamber of commerce of Prato on behalf of textile producers provided that it is difficult for them to compete with China because their factories have no more than 100 or 200 employees. The sectary of local Filtea-Cgil, Manuele Manigolli put into doubt that if Chinese textile sector gets the state subsidy. Another group like Commissione di Studio sui Distretti Produttivi Italiani advocated to cap Chinese garments. According to them, the unfair Chinese challenge to Italian textiles has led to the damage of Italian exportation.[24]
Meanwhile, Filtea-Cgil was not only seeking the help from the Italian government but also from European level to accelerate the procedure of employing safeguard against China.[25] Fashion Association and trade union of textile sector (Le Associazioni di categoria della filiera della moda e le Organizzazioni Sindacali del settore) lobby Italian government and the Commission to protect not only their interest but also that of European market.[26]
Tuscany is a traditional textile-producing region in Italy. Claudio Martini, President of Tuscany Region said that he had met with Italian vice minister of produce activity and Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson to present deeply concern on the issue of textile crisis. He further unified other European textile-producing regions and cites in line with pushing pressure on the European Commission.[27] Moreover, he went to China in June of 2005 to discuss the issues on textiles and footwear sectors.
Italian producers association cooperated with EURATEX (The European Apparel and Textile Organization)
Since Italy has strong T&C industry it no wonder plays a relevant role in the European Apparel and Textile Organization (EURATEX).[28] The Italian textiles-Fashion sector sent a message to the Commission through Euratex. Euratex, for its part, made an ardent plea to the Commission on 9 March for safeguard measures. Received the request for safeguards against certain Chinese textile imports presented by Euratex, Commissioner Mandelson started the assessment. The Commission first published guidelines that would clarify under what circumstances it would consider Textiles-Specific Safeguard Clause (TSSC) action against textile and clothing imports from China.[29] On 14 April Peter Mandelson met with representatives of the Italian textile industry and Euratex to discuss the safeguards against Chinese textile exports.[30]
Italian textile and clothing producers showed their influence by unifying all relevant associations not only at national level but also European level. This advocating coalition was so powerful that trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson needed to placate Italian textile producers in Florence.[31] When EU decided to release Chinese clothing blocked in the port, Italy was angry at the EU’s conduct.[32]
Even in June of 2007 Peter Mandelson decided to quit the quota he had sent a letter to Italy’s best- selling newspaper, Corriere della Serra to explain current situation.[33]
During two years and half of breathing time (quota against China until the end of 2007), Italian producers tended to extend the period of quota against China for one year and transfer its rules, like adopting trademark of original country, fighting with counterfeit and so on to European law.[34] Furthermore, the Commission accepted the Italian proposal of obligatory trademark of original country of extra-EU in 16 December 2005.[35]
Opposite position of Italian retailers and consumer association
Despite the phase-out of ATC and removal of quota, retailers lost amount of money from this event. United Colors of Benetton and Sisley, big Italian clothing producers and retailers was a victim.[36] Paolo Banfi, President of textile machinery manufacturers textile machinery industry (ACIMIT)[37], had 19 percent of Italian textile machine exports went to China, call for quitting the quota.[38] In addition, Italian consumer association took side with retailers.[39] Commission of European Consumer Consultative Group supported the action of Italian consumer association. Italian consumer association on behalf of consumers wrote a letter to Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson to consider consumers’ benefit.[40]
In spite of their close business connection with China Italian government was hardly to stand on their side. The voice of Italian retailers cannot be heard by national government due to national interest, so Italian retailers turned to European level and sided with European retailer associations.[41] Some examples can be cited: the European Association of National Organizations of Textile Retailers (AEDT), which represents 400,000 retailers in Europe, urged in a statement that a solution be found without delay.[42] Other relevant importers and retailers are represented by the Brussels-based associations, for instance Eurocommerce, the Foreign Trade Association (FTA) and the European Association of Fashion Retailers supported by big retailer companies such as Carrefour, Metro, Inditex, Esprit Europe and Adidas.[43]
The reaction of Italian institutions
The action taken by Italian Parliament
To curb illegal Chinese goods Italian House of Representatives approved in 7 June of 2005 the application of obligatory trademark (Made in Italy).[44] The members of parliament lashed out the Chinese textile products by the data of Euratex claiming that those products had increased 46,5 percent and thus urged the government to apply the sanction at the European level in order to protect the national industry.[45] During the break time that EU imposed quota against China, Italian parliament at home has ruled the obligatory trademark, fighting against counterfeit and monitoring of imported textiles and clothing goods in order to take further measures to protect Italian textile industry from the Chinese challenge.[46] Italian parliament also urged government to transfer above measures it approved into European rules.
Action taken by Italian Government (Before first agreement with China)
Italian government was under the pressure of large numbers of associations and textile producers. Italian Minister of Productive Activities (Il ministro delle attività produttive) Antonio Marzano, wrote to Peter Mandelson to call for safeguard.[47] Minister of Economics, Giulio Tremonti also consented to safeguard.[48] Minister of Labor and Welfare, Roberto Maroni sharing the same position with his party (Lega Nord), proposed to apply anti-dumping measure.
Italian Deputy Minister of Productive Activities, Adolfo Urso met American undersecretary of Trade, Grant Aldonas talking about the monitor system of Chinese textile products.[49] Mr. Urso on behalf of Italian textile sectors argued that the anti-dumping tariff allowed by the Clause of Safeguards could be applied by the Commission to curb Chinese goods.[50] Adolfo Urso visited Peter Mandelson talking primarily about the impact of Chinese textile imports on European and Italian manufacturers in the wake of the removal of textile quotas on January 1 2005. Later on 16 March, Adolfo Urso exhorted Peter Mandelson to impose quotas on Chinese-origin textiles and clothing garments. Italian government already sent a letter earlier in March 2005 officially requesting safeguard measures, along with Portugal, citing that the Community industry is at grave risk of injury.[51] The European Commission has said it was considering steps to slow Chinese textile imports, fearing they may grossly exceed levels over the past few years when they were restricted by quotas.[52]
After the first agreement reached by both sides Italian Deputy Minister of Productive Activities, Adolfo Urso was content with the Sino-EU agreement in June of 2005. Meanwhile, Italian Premier, Silvio Berlusconi announced the victory in Senate that the Commission would employ safeguard to protect 20 categories of textiles and clothing.[53] But, two months later EU was forced to sign the other agreement with China to release the stockpiles of textiles and clothing goods in the European port. Northern League, as its part, claimed the wrongdoing of the EU, for instance Roberto Cota, under-sectary of Ministry of Productive Activities required furiously Italian Premier, Berlusconi to interfere this event.[54]
A spokesman for the Italian government over the issue of release of shipments said Italy was ready to the compromise with other EU Member States.[55] Mr. Urso in a statement on 25 August argued that we are reaching the maximum import quota for several types of Chinese textile items, but there is a clear sign that Chinese textile exports will have taken over one third of the European market by the end of 2007. Mr Urso considered that Italy’s textile sector is alive and kicking thanks to the quantitative restriction.[56] As a result, Mr Urso stated the position of Italian government is to bring China’s 2006 export quotas forward to the year of 2005.[57] After all, Italy was seeking the support from the France and other textile producing countries.
In the period of breathing time (September 2005-the end of 2007) Italy sought to impose Italian law with regard to protect T&C sector to the European level. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi received at Palazzo Chigi with a delegation of SMI-ATI and other associations, including Paolo Zegna (President), Michele Tronconi (Acting Vice President and President of Euratex) and Gianfranco Di Natale (General Director) concerning about the recovery of T&C sector.[58]
As the phase-out of quota was coming again Italian Minister for International Commerce and European Policies Emma Bonino (May of 2006-January 2008) on 5 June 2007 claimed to extend a further year of the period of quota against China due to the expiry in the end of 2007.[59] Italian proposal is advocated by Portugal, France, Union des Industries Textiles (Uit), Euratex, the man-made fibre industry body (CIRFS), AIUFFASS (users of man-made filament yarns and silks) and Eurocoton.[60] However, such idea was never a popular solution accepted by all EU Member States, in particular North Club. Hence, the opposite attitude of the importing countries turned Italy to support double-check monitor system.[61] At least, Emma Bonino ensured Italian position on 31 July 2007 of accepting double-check monitor system because a majority of EU Member States was in favor of so-called system.[62]
Conclusions
Considering T&C sector is vital for Italy, thence Italian government gave way to taking the protectionist decision to meet the need of trade union, textile producers and employees. A great deal of societal roles was involved in the textile event at not only national level but at European level, because the initiative of the Commission, the outcome of negotiation and the final say of the Council about Sino-EU textile dispute will affect the benefit of many parts involved in this issue. Owing to the vital interest of T&C sector, Italy as a pioneer made an attempt to impose the quota against China and beefed up its influence to the European level is understandable. The outcome of Sino-EU negotiation marked the victory not only of Italy but the EU Member States of textile producers. On the one hand, Italy successfully aligned other Member States to defend their national interest. On the other hand, this event indicated the importance of domestic factors to the international negotiation. Even though there was opposite voice against protectionism within Italy textile producers still can achieve their aim by forming a big advocating coalition not only from national level but European level to affect national government and the Commission.
Under the pressure of strong Italian textile associations and trade unions, Italian government was keen to support them in the wake of the interest of the T&C sector as national interest, even though Italian retailers and importers have close business with China. The voice of Italian retailers cannot be heard by national government due to national interest, so Italian retailers turned to European level and sided with European retailer associations. On 8 March Italian Productive Activities Minister Antonio Marzano told that the data from the first two months of monitoring were alarming and Italy has raised the issue of the problems for the textiles and clothing industry. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi raised the issue again at the spring EU summit on March 22-23.
Strong European textile producers led by Italy and Euratex successfully affected the European decision to impose the quota against China by ardently lobbying the Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Italian textile producers, textile associations and trade unions did a fantastic job to reintroduce the quota that Trade Commissioner had promised not to go back. With successful mobilization of Italy, 13 EU Member States including South European Countries and Central-East Countries under the pressure of European textile producers urged to impose quota. Despite removal of the quota imposed on Chinese garments was decided in October of 2007 Italy had done a range of safeguards to defend its interest from Chinese threat in the near future.
The T&C sector, one of major pillars of Italian economy is experiencing a tough crisis facing the liberalization of this sector and the emergence of made in Chinitaly that the products with low quality but made by Chinese immigrants in Italy. Until now, Italy has successfully imposed the origin mark system into European law with the help of friends such as France, Spain and Portugal in order to deal with illegal Chinese garments. In addition, the protection of intellectual property of the European goods has been set on the European agenda against Chinese counterfactual goods. Of course, if China can respect the rules of the WTO like what Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, the president of Confindustria has said, there will not loom the trade row between the EU and the China.
Unless to say, three-level game provided a clear-cut picture in which Italian national interest was pushed from national level to the international level. With this framework a slew of national interest of each EU Member State trying to influence European and international level can be dug out with case study.
Appendix 1-The position of relevant roles about in favor of or against quota
Associations, companies Position (against)
Associations, companies Position (favor)
CNA (Confederazione Nazionale Dell’Artigianato e Della Piccola e Media Impresa)
FEDERAZIONE NAZIONALE DELLA
MODA CONFARTIGIANATO
Smi-Ati (il Sistema Moda Italiana e l’Associazione Tessile Italiana)
The Italian textiles-Fashion sector (Federazione Imprese Tessili e Moda Italiane)
3 Trade Union (Femca Cisl, Filtea Cgil and Uilta-Uil)
Fashion Association and trade union of textile sector (Le Associazioni di categoria della filiera della moda e e le Organizzazioni Sindacali del settore)
ITF (Italian Texile Fashion)
ConfCommercio
ACIMIT (Italian textile machinery manufacturers)
Italian association of consumer (Altroconsumo)
Benetton, Sisley and other retailers
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[1] Ph.D in Comparative and European Politics of University of Siena and Assistant Professor at Department of Italian Culture and language of Fu Jen Catholic University.
[2] When ex-French President Jacques Chirac said that there was brutal and unacceptable invasion of the
European and US markets by Chinese textiles. And when all five countries of the South Europe camp wrote to the European Commission appealing for EU’s action to end the surges of clothing imports from China meanwhile, on the contrary, government ministers from four countries of North Club (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden) argued for ensuring the stockpiled clot Gregor, R. and Hollinger, P, “Brussels to Probe Chinese Textile Import”, Financial Times, 19 April 2005.
[3] In order to understand what Mandelson did, you have to understand that in April he was being
burned in effigy by Italian textile manufactures outside the Commission building in Brussels, see in China, Mandelson recovered his gloss”, The International Herald Tribune, September 9 2005.
[4] Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and theories of international relations”, 289-313.
Frederick W. Mayer, “Making Domestic Differences in international negotiations: Strategic Use in
internal side-payments,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1992, pp. 793-818. Frederick W.
Mayer, “Domestic Politics and the Strategy of International Trade,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1991, pp. 222-246.
[5] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 121.
[6] Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade, and Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
[7] Jongryn Mo, “Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, (Dec., 1995), pp. 914-924. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic- International Linkages, (Feb., 1997), pp. 117-146. Keisuke Iida, “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, (Sep., 1993), pp. 403-426. Jongryn Mo, “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3, (Sep., 1994), pp. 402-422.
[8] The model considers international negotiations between two countries as simultaneous negotiations at both the domestic level and the international level (two negotiators from the governments). Over domestic negotiations, the government builds coalitions with societal actors; while at the international level, the government tries to implement these concerns that will have deleterious effects at home by negotiating with its counter-part. Win-sets are the main concerns in two-level game theory. Win-sets occur when the concerns of actors at both levels overlap, large win-sets make an international agreement is likely. See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, 1988, pp. 427-460.
[9] This increase in Chinese imports is linked to a decrease in the production of T-shirts in the EU, mainly in Greece (-12%), Portugal (-30% to -50%) and Slovenia (-8%).
[10] These include pullovers, men’s trousers, blouses, t-shirts, dresses, bras, flax yarn, cotton fabrics, bed linen, as well as table and kitchen linen. See COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1084/2005 of 8 July 2005 amending Annexes II, III and V to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3030/93 on common rules for imports of certain textile products from third countries.
[11] Speech by Peter Mandelson, EU – China Textiles: “Manage change and adjustment, not trade”, Speech to textile producers, Florence, Italy, 6 June 2005, SPEECH/05/325, available at < temp="sppm033_en">.
[12] The distributors argued that these shipments were done by the contracts with Chinese exporters dated from before the EU-China trade agreement. See Netherlands Germany, Denmark and Sweden asked External Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson for making import restrictions more flexible”, Agence Europe, Brussels 17 August 2005.
[13] What this system asks is that China needs to issue an export license for all exports and the EU licensing offices in the Members States will issue an import license relatively, see European Commission, The report of EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson to European Parliament about textiles: Comments on European Textiles in China and the outcome of the EU-China Summit in Beijing, Strasbourg, 13 December 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm189_en.htm.
[14] The location of T&C sector is very immense. In North Italy, there are many locations in each province, for example, Trento (Borgo Valsugana), Veneto (San Bonifacio, Lonigo, Schio), in Lombardy ( Busto Arsizio, Gallarate, Como, Clusone ) and in Emilia Romagna (Correggio,Carpi, Santa Sofia); In Central Italy there are Toscana (Casentino-Val Tiberina, Empoli, Prato, Poggibonzi), In Marche (Cagli, Pergola, Ostra, Cingoli ) , in Umbria ( Assisi, Ubertide) and in Lazio (Valle del Liri); In South Italy, there are Abruzzo ( Giulianova, Teramo, Crecchio), Campania ( San Marco dei Cavoti, Calitri, Sant’Agata dei Goti, San Giuseppe Vesuviano), Basilicata (Pescopagano), Puglia ( Putignano, Martina Franca, Nardò-Gallipoli) and Sicily (Ucria-Sinagra).
[15] European Commission, “Economic and Competitiveness analysis of the European textile and clothing sector in support of the Communication: The future of the textiles and clothing sector in the enlarged Europe ”, Commission Staff Working Paper, 21/ 11 2003, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/textile/documents/sec2003_1345en.pdf.
[16] Italy had argued that it has already lost nearly 50,000 jobs in the past years (2003, 2004). The textile industry has almost 70 thousand companies and employed 570, 000 people in Italy in 2003 or one third of textile workers employed in what was then 15-state EU. This sector offers large occupation, in particular for female workers (70% of 800,000 employees).
[17] Morgando, “La Crisi del Comparto Tessile, Intervento 4 maggio 2005 dell’ on. Morgando - Dirigente Nazionale Dipartimento Politiche Industriali,” Margherita online, 01-06-2005, http://www.margheritaonline.it/dipartimenti/scheda.php?id_dipartimenti=8829&sezione=3.
[18] Commissione Europea, “La Comunicazione della Commissione delle Comunità Europee “Il futuro del settore tessile e dell’abbigliamento nell’UE allargata: Commento e valutazioni del settore TA italiano”, Milano, 23 gennaio 2004, http://www2.cna.it/servizi/cnabruxelles/servizi/Posizioni%20comuni/Tessile/Comunicato_definitivoTA.pdf.
[19] This association contains 28,000 textiles and clothing companies in Italy. It argued that Lombardian Region like Como, Sondrio, Brescia, Bergamo, Legnano, Val Canonica, Brianza and South regions like Tricase, Casarano and Nardò, have lost 6,000 employees in 4 years. In 2004 nearly 120 companies closed. See Confartigianato Newletter, http://195.103.237.153/minisiti/categorie/moda/se_moda.jsp?id=348.
[20] Smi-Ati representing about 2,000 partner companies with about 100,000 workers is one of the largest Federations.
[21] Some proposals they offered as the following: 1. Introduce the original label “Made in Italy” 2. Stand up for clamping down on counterfeit. 3. Impose the sanction. 4. Strike down the illegal importation. See “Prosegue la Mobilitazione del Sistema Moda”, Comunicato ai lavoratori: FEMCA - FILTEA – UILTA, 18 January 2005.
[22] Silvia Gambi, “La Crisi del tessile spinge a Prato tremila operai in Piazza”, L’Unità, 9/3/05; Ilaria Ciuti, “Tessile, governo e Ue si muovano”, La Repubblica, 9/3/05; Stefano Vetusti, “Operai e industriali uniti per salvare la moda: Piccolo non è più bello, il governo ci aiuti”, La Nazione, 9/3/05, also see http://www.cgil.it/FIRENZE/2005/empoli.htm.
[23] La Cina si avvicina, abolite tutte le barriere doganali, La Repubblica, 10/01/2005, available at <>.
[24] Marco Fortis, “Il punto sui Distretti Industriali”, Distretti, 21/06/2006, 18.
[25] Marco Togna, “Non dazi, ma politiche industriali”, Rassegna on line del lavoro, politica ed economica sociale, 4 November 2003, http://www.rassegna.it/2003/settori/tessile/prato.htm; “Tessile, Fedeli Export Cina: Dato Abnorme, Governo intervenga”, CGIL Ufficio Stampa, 23 March 2005, http://www.cgil.it/ufficiostampa/ufsta/ht/index.htm.
[26] Confartigianato Moda, “Petizione del comparto moda per richiedere condizioni di commercio equo e sostenibile nel settore tessile abbigliamento calzaturiero e pelletteria”, http://195.103.237.153/minisiti/categorie/moda/FedModa/Notizie/20050225pet.htm.
[27] The interview of Claudio Martini, “Impegno pieno della regione per la crisi del tessile”, L’Unità, 08/04/2005, http://presidente.regione.toscana.it/index.php?codice=10227.
[28] Interview with director of economic affairs of EURATEX, Francesco Marchi, 24 April 2006.
[29] European Commission, Guidelines for the use of safeguards on Chinese textiles exports to the EU, Brussels, 6 April 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/memo060405_en.htm.
[30] European Commission, China - Textiles: The Commission examines request for safeguards, Brussels, 14 April 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/pr140405_en.htm.
[31] European Commission, “Speech by Peter Mandelson to textile producers, EU-China Textiles: Manage change and adjustment, not trade”, Palazzo della Regione, Florence, Italy, 6 June 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm033_en.htm.
[32] Notiziario CAN Federmoda, Ottobre 2005, http://www.cnacremona.it/portale/images/allegati/federmodaeu0510.pdf.
[33] “EU lifts Chinese textile quotas”, Euractiv, 10 October 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-lifts-chinese-textile-quotas/article-167516.
[34] For example, ITF (Italian Textile Fashion), group of Italian Chamber of Commerce tried to influence Italian government to support the system of monitoring of textile products sold on European Markets, see speech of Luca Mantellassi, 25 September 2006, http://www.unioncamere.eu/images/stories/doc/doc%20news%20Uc%20Bruxelles/intervento%20presidente%20mantellassi%20(2).pdf.
[35] Ersilia Monti, “Intervista ad Antonio Franceschini, secretario nazionale dell’Unione CNA Federmoda”, 02 March 2007, http://abitipuliti.org:8080/abitipuliti/news/inter.
[36] “Benetton e la crisi del tessile,” Newsletter del 25 March, 2005, http://it.supereva.com/finanzaworld/content.php?canale=analisiitalia&file=analisi_italia/2005-03-25.xml.
[37] This association represents Italian numbers approximately 300 manufacturers, with 22,000 workers and an overall annual turnover of 2,532 billion euros.
[38] Interview with Chinese diplomat of Rome in 27 May 2007, and see China’s textile machine market hot, 2004-01-20, http://www.chinademands.com/news.jhtml?method=detail&channelId=279&docId=476275.
[39] Altroconsumo is an Italian association of consumer. President of Altroconsumo, Paolo Martinello criticized that the quota against China was unacceptable because it hurt the Italian consumer’s interest.
[40] “Prodotti tessili dalla Cina. Altroconsumo: non tutto fila per il consumatore”, 13 May 2005, http://www.altroconsumo.it/map/show/12740/src/81961.htm.
[41] Interview with Italian diplomat who takes part in 133 Committee in Brussels in 25 April 2006.
[42] Chris Buckley, “China calls on Europe to ease textile quotas: Talks set to begin as containers pile up”, International Herald Tribune, 26 August 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/25/business/textile.php.
[43] Interview with servant of European Trade Commission, 24 April 2006.
[44] XIV LEGISLATURA, XIV COMMISSIONE, SEDUTA DEL 14 Settembre 2005, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stencomm/14/indag/iniziative_comunitarie/2005/0914/pdf001.pdf.
[45] XIV LEGISLATURA, ALLEGATO B AI RESOCONTI, SEDUTA DEL 2 MAGGIO 2005. Atti Parlamentari, 19014-19020.
[46] Mozioni sulle iniziative per favorire la tracciabilità di prodotti importati, n. 228 del 22/10/2007, http://www.camera.it/resoconti/resoconto_allegato.asp?idSeduta=0228&Resoconto=amoz02.
[47] The Italian version of his letter. «Non auspichiamo certo, signor Commissario, l’introduzione di dazi (salvo i cosiddetti dazi antidumping) quanto piuttosto la piena e puntuale applicazione di quelle misure di salvaguardia che i meccanismi comunitari contemplano a fronte di principi di fair competition da parte dei paesi terzi.
[48] “Ora sono tutti pro dazi”, L’Archivio, 19 Maggio 2005, http://jjbthearchive.wordpress.com/2005/05/19/ora-sono-tutti-pro-dazi/.
[49] TESSILE, URSO: “ITALIA E USA INSIEME PER MONITORARE IMPORT CINESE”, Comunicato Stampa del Ministero del Commercio Internazionale, Roma, 15 marzo 2005, http://www.mincomes.it/storico/news2005/marzo/cs150305.htm.
[50] Ibid, see http://www.mincomes.it/news/news2005/marzo/cs150305.htm.
[51] Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Italy, among others, pushes for textile safeguards, but Commission waits for guidelines and figures”, 31 March 2005, http://sme.tdctrade.com/sme_content.aspx?contentid=341903&src=sme_tm&sec=Textile&w_sid=194&w_pid=903&w_nid=11605&w_cid=341903&w_idt=1900-01-01&w_oid=166&w_jid=.
[52] Visit of Adolfo Urso, Italian Deputy Minister for Productive Activities, to Peter Mandelson, Audiovisual services, 16/03/2005, http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/video_search_en.cfm?videoref=&StartRow=141&keyword=mandelson&witch=video&src=1.
[53] Jake su, “Ora sono tutti pro dazi”, L’Archivio, 19 Maggio 2005, http://jjbthearchive.wordpress.com/2005/05/19/ora-sono-tutti-pro-dazi/.
[54] Luisa Grion, “Compromesso tra i Paesi della Ue. Ora l’Italia approva il via libera di Bruxelles”, La Repubblica, 6 settembre 2005, http://tradewatch.it/osservatorio/articles/art_414.html.
[55] Graham Bowley, “Retailers not thrilled by China textile deal, but EU countries likely to clear accord,” International Herald Tribune, SEPTEMBER 7, 2005,, accessible 7 May 2007.
[56] Nevertheless, Italy needs some restructuring in order to address the needs of its 800,000 employees. Italy will ask the Textile Committee to allocate part of the 2006-2013 structural funds to the textile industry. Now it needs to do just as much to protect the shoemaking industry by activating anti-dumping measures.
[57] “Italian Textile Industry Is Alive And Kicking But Needs Restructuring”, August 25 2005, http://www.tg-supply.com/article/view.html?id=13982.
[58] “Prodi meets with Smi-Ati management Tuesday 25 July”, Mare Moda news 2006, http://www.maredimoda.com/html/Read-news.30+M5a04ff9435d.0.html?&L=1.
[59] She claimed that the deadline of quota against China of Brazil, South Africa and U.S. is in the end of 2008, so if the period of quota against China of the EU is end one year before that all Chinese products in textiles and clothing would flow into EU market.
[60] Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Chinese textile suppliers to EU unlikely to face new safeguard procedures in 2008”, 23 November 2007, http://www.tdctrade.com/imn/07112304/textiles032.htm.
[61] “Prodotti tessili cinesi: dal 2008 stop alle quote sulle esportazioni”, 30 luglio 2007, http://www.consocometa.com/index.php?Itemid=110&id=1050&option=com_content&task=view.
[62] Giseppe Sarcina, “Mandelson scrive: basta quote tessili Via libera ai cinesi”, http://www.rosanelpugno.it/rosanelpugno/node/17175.
Meng-jen Chang[1]
Abstract
“Bras war” took place in 2005 and is terminated in October 2007. What the interesting point was that this event divided EU Member States into two parts (in favor or against quotas towards China). Italy involved in this crisis was one of most influential countries being eager to impose the safeguards on China. The Sino-EU trade dispute occurred because of the Italian mobilization to defend the interest of the European textile producers. The case study that Italy tended to transfer its national interest to international negotiation table brought us a clear-cut picture in which domestic affairs influence international negotiation. When governments met in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Here, again we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic negotiation by observing the Italian role within the EU.
Keywords: Bras War, Sino-EU Textile dispute, Italy, three-level game
國內利益與歐中紡織貿易衝突-義大利角色
摘要
歐中內衣大戰緣起於2005年中旬，於2007年十月真正落幕，肇因世貿組織架構下的紡織與服裝條約的終止。事件的發生，著實造成歐盟內部成員國分裂，一派支持設限；另一派則持自由貿易口號。歐中紡織紛爭中，鑑於義大利擁有最大的紡織工業，為了國家利益，義大利是強烈要求對中成衣設限的會員國。貿易紛爭的發生最大原因歸咎於義大利藉宣稱捍衛歐洲紡織市場與代表歐盟紡織業者的利益，進行內部廣泛的動員與跨國結盟，迫使主張自由貿易派失利以及歐中紡織糾紛的加劇。歐中紡織紛爭的案例可看出歐盟會員國政府在國際談判桌上的動作，反應出其國內利益的考量，本文借觀察義大利在歐盟的角色來分析內部因素在國際經濟談判的重要性。
關鍵詞： 內衣大戰、歐中紡織紛爭、義大利，三層次賽局
Introduction
The major subject of this paper is the observation of Italian reaction to protect the European textile and clothing industry as European import quotas was capped on Chinese textiles and clothing goods in 2005-2007. The political drama regarding the “bras war” became a spotlight and thus a host of international media paid attention on this event.[2] Although Sino-EU textile row took place in 2005 it indeed drop the curtain in October 2007.
Drawing on the three-level game approach, this research aims at figuring out the Italian influence on so-called event. How and to what extent did the Italy influence and participate in the EU trade policy decision-making? Do domestic factors matter in the international negotiations? Do national interest affect the outcome of trade negotiations?
A brief review of the literature with respect to the links of domestic politics to international negotiations will be discussed in the following section. After an overview of literature, the next part will mention about the evolution of Sino-EU textile dispute (2005-2007) and then next step is to explore the domestic factors in terms of Italian mobilization that affect the EU’s trade policy towards China.
This paper, through an examination of Sino-EU trade disputes, offers an explanation about how the domestic politics influence the outcome of international negotiation. Since there are neither sufficient data and expertise nor space to cover all the 25 EU Member States in this contribution, the following analysis will focus principally on one of pivotal players of the third-level game, that of Italy. This is not to suggest that Italy constitutes the crucial player among the EU Member States to decide on the relationships with China. Apart from the major players France and Spain, there are also several Member States like Scandinavian countries who particularly play counterparts within the EU towards Chinese textile products. The role choice of Italy pivots on its biggest textile industry, fierce reaction and on its pioneer of lobbying the European Commission.[3] In addition, the negotiation outcome has been seemed to the victory of trade protectionism within the EU. It is worthy digging out the Italian influence in this event because of above reasons. The paper concludes that the three-level game will bring clear-cut process of the EU decision-making in which Italy promoted its national interest to the European level by aligning other EU Member States of South Europe and Central-East Europe. The final goal of the analysis is to assess the mobilization of interest groups in Italy and the role and performance of the Italian government in a European policy field against China during three periods of Sino-EU negotiations.
Analytical Framework: the Three-level Game, the link of Domestic Politics and International Negotiation
Most theories of international relations neglect the influence of domestic politics because they consider the state as a unitary actor. A growing literature on International factors can matter international negotiation, but what lacks is a theory of domestic influences, especially there is a dearth of their interaction with international factors. A growing literature on endogenous policy formation treats interest groups as participant in a competition for political favors. For the analyst of international negotiation, they have noted that the existence of domestic differences. On the contrary, from the realist school’s point of view, the better understanding of international relations and international negotiations is to dig out the interplay of unitary, rational and national actors, who pursue their maximized self-interest.
Although Neo-realism admits that domestic politics is not very important to explain significant foreign policy decisions or international political outcomes a slew of recent researches on the international relations field advances the proposition that domestic politics is typically a centerpiece of the explanation for states’ foreign policies.[4] A systemic theory depicts states as unitary, rational actors, rather a domestic-political explanation treats one state as non-unitary, and which pursues a sub-optimal foreign policy because of the interaction of the actors represented within the state. Differences among states in their internal preferences and political institutions have important effects on international politics. Moreover, domestic political interactions lead to diverse state foreign policy practices. As a consequence, Waltz admits that neo-realist theory of international politics can’t be a theory of foreign policy.[5] Milner also spoke up that states are not unitary actors; that is, they are composed of actors with varying preferences who share power over decision-making.[6] International politics and foreign policy become parts of the domestic struggle for power and the search for internal compromise. How do domestic politics matter? Great deal of literatures on political economy indicates that domestic politics connect deeply with international trade negotiations.[7] Large numbers of literatures about two-level games initiated by Putnam are eager to answer this abovementioned question.[8] However, due to particular status of the EU two-level games theory seems to be unfit to be put on the EU. Instead, three-level game extended by two-level game can depict how Italian-led position can be transferred to European level and to the international negotiation table.
The background of Sino-EU trade row on textile
Like European T&C sector had predicted, following the final stage of liberalization on January 1 2005, textile and clothing exports to Europe from China experienced a rapid upsurge and sharply drops in unit prices. Some categories of imports increased in a matter of months were 100% or more. On 14 March European Textile and Apparel Association (Euratex) first asked EU and 25 Member States to take the safeguard with regard to 12 categories of imported Chinese textile products. European producers together pushed the Commission to take a tough stand in a way that EU should use the safeguard against China in order to protect their interest. 13 Member States urged to curb Chinese garments by any safeguard measures as soon as possible.
Indeed, the investigation revealed a dramatic deterioration of production and employment in the European T&C sector in some kind of categories.[9] EU Member States likely to lose its advantage would be the Central and Eastern European countries, which benefit from tariff-free access.
On 17 May 2005, Peter Mandelson launched formal consultations with China for two of the nine categories of textile imports i.e. T-shirts and flax yarns after trade data revealed significant increases (ranging between 51% and 534 %) in Chinese imports. A formal request for consultations was made on 27 May 2005.
Meanwhile, the irate Chinese authorities were about to eliminate export tariffs on 81 categories from 1 June 2005 to show their rage in return. At moment the Sino-EU textile dispute was likely to escalate. As a result, rather than using the Textile Specific Safeguard Clause the EU and China reached an agreement that would cap Chinese imports at agreed levels each year until 2008. This agreement covers 10 product categories that will be restricted to a certain rate of imports, while allowing for an average growth in exports from China to Europe.[10] These annual allowances would be subject to an annual increase from 8% to 12.5% in ten categories of textiles quotas EU investigated. This would allow Chinese exports to continue to grow, but at a rate that would allow EU producers to adjust their structure.[11] Basically, this agreement was agreed upon that China would limit its export growth to the EU for a period of 3 years from 2005 to the end of 2007.
However, by the end of August, the difficulties of the shipment have emerged because China has already exceeded its 2005 export quotas for sweaters and men’s trousers, two of the 10 categories covered by a China-EU textiles agreement signed in last June. The stockpile for sweaters has reached 55m items, seven out of ten categories of textiles quotas were already reached alarming levels, blocking whopping stocks of garments in European ports, and stirring once again angry reactions from EU distributors (most from the north Europe).[12]
Textile-producer Member States such as South Europe and Central-East Europe obviously insisted that any quota increase for 2005 needed to be included into the quotas of 2006 and 2007 in order to maintain the sum of quotas granted by the Shanghai agreement until 2008. On the contrary, Northern Europe supported the increase in Chinese textile import ceilings for 2005 and leaved quotas for the following years unchanged.
Mandelson cannot help but renegotiate with China in order to meet the need of the opposite lobbies and get out of gridlock. On September 5, he came to terms with Chinese commerce minister, letting in the 88 million items (valued at around 600 million dollars) blocked at the EU borders, and including half of these stocks in China’s 2006 quota and in unfilled quotas of other textile products for 2005.
Double-Checking System replaced quotas using (Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing) (2007/10)
Those products covered by the agreement with China have increased more slowly thanks to ‘Memorandum of Understanding with Beijing. European textile-producer countries temporarily got a breath time. During this transitional period, the Commission under the Italian-led producer member states’ proposal supported European companies like Prada and Gucci to fight against the Chinese counterfeit. The Commission has also backed the idea of an Origin Marking system proposed by Italy for certain products including textiles that would require imported textiles to carry an origin label in which let consumers know what clothes they buy. The fears still remain that a trade war is likely to be triggered over textile issues by the expiry of textile quotas by the end of 2007. France, Italy and Spain supported the proposal proposed by Euratex to extend the period of quota for one year, however Northern Europe ruled out this idea and counterpart, China as well.
New agreement was reached in October of 2007 by imposing no restrictions on imports, but both sides were committed to cooperating to ensure a smooth transition. The Commission worked out new idea and proposed China a double-checking surveillance system for 2008 that would cover eight textiles product categories with particular sensitivities to replace quotas applied against China.[13] The benefit from this system is to call off the quotas but set condition for China in which allows EU to monitor textile import patterns, by which imports have to be licensed before they leave the dock in China and allows EU to see in advance likely developments. At the beginning, China rejected this proposal initiated by the Commission. China accepted this proposal after it had pondered on this measure over and over.
Domestic Factors of EU Member States: Italy as a leading competing trade structure country with China
Why Italy had fierce reaction about the restrictions on Chinese garments? It at first should be mentioned about T&C sector in Italy. Obviously, Italy keeps its strong leadership in terms of its contribution to total T&C employment and is by far the most prominent location for this industry.[14] This prominence is particularly remarkable in the clothing sub-sector where Italy accounts for close to 40% of EU production.[15] In each of the three sub-sectors within the textiles, clothing and leather manufacturing sector, Italy was one of the principal manufacturing Member States both in terms of value added and employment. A little over one third (34.1 %) of the value added generated by the textiles, clothing and leather manufacturing sector as a whole in the EU-25 came from Italy in 2003 (EUR 22.5 billion) (see Table 1).
Table 1 Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products (NACE Subsections DB and DC) Value added and employment: ranking of the top 5 Member States, 2003
Rank
Highest value added (EUR million) (1)
Share in EU-25 value added
(%) (1)
Highest number of persons employed (thousands) (2)
Share in EU-25 employment
(%) (2)
Highest share of national industrial value added
(%) (3)
Highest share of national industrial employment
(%) (4)
1
Italy (22 479.8)
34.1
Italy (757.5)
25.2
Portugal (14.9)
Portugal (30.8)
2
France (8247.0)
12.5
Poland (298.9)
10.0
Lithuania (11.4)
Lithuania (23.5)
3
Germany (8046.9)
12.2
Portugal (284.9)
9.5
Estonia (10.7)
Estonia (18.8)
4
Spain (6 695.6)
10.1
Spain (279.6)
9.3
Italy (10.1)
Italy (15.4)
5
United Kingdom (6481.3)
9.8
France (227.4)
7.6
Luxembourg (7.7)
Malta (14.9)
(1) Hungary, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Austria, not available.
(2) Sweden, provisional; Hungary, Malta and Slovakia, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Cyprus and Austria, not available.
(3) Slovakia and Sweden, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Latvia, Hungary, Malta and Austria, not available.
(4) Sweden, provisional; Hungary, Malta and Slovakia, 2002; Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Austria, not available.
Source: Eurostat (SBS)
Textile sector is one of the core pillars of the Italian economy, but the vulnerable industry was quaking as the end of quota on Chinese imports took place.[16] The export of textiles and clothing contributes 10% in total Italian export. Italians are very proud of this traditional textile sector that created huge Italian export.[17] However, Italian textile manufacturers have been pressed hard by Chinese competition.
The incessant protests organized by uneasy employees brought about sharp strike in Italy that it drew an attention of all political parties and government who were involved this purely domestic account. Italian T&C sectors claimed that the quantity of Chinese garments obviously increased 449,5 percent from the January 2004 to January 2005, in particular the quantity of Chinese bra has arisen 25.2 per cent comparing to 2004-2005. According to the data of ISTAT (Istituto nazionale di statistica), the percentage of textiles and clothing goods imported from China arose 63,7% in February 2005 than last year. Imports of clothing went up 41,3%. Table 2 and table 3 indicated that China is a biggest imported source of textiles and clothing to Italy.
Table 2Value of Italian Import from key Market- Textile sector
2004
Weight%
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2006
Weight%
World
6.984
100
6.986
100
1.698
100
1.853
100
China
790
11,3
1.133
16,2
255
15
319
17,2
Germany
721
10,3
685
9,8
179
10,6
198
10,7
Turkey
495
7,1
518
7,4
135
7,9
149
8,1
France
493
7,1
440
6,3
116
6,9
111
6
Fonte: Elaborazione Osservatorio Economico Ministero Commercio Internazionale su dati ISTAT
Table 3 Value of Italian Import from key Market- Clothing sector
2004
Weight%
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2005
Weight%
Gen-March
2006
Weight%
World
7.553
100
8.191
100
2.194
100
2.530
100
China
1.520
20,1
1.952
23,8
443
20,2
546
21,6
Germany
1.035
13,7
973
11,9
262
11,9
253
10
Turkey
587
7,8
586
7,2
158
7,2
164
6,5
France
476
6,3
533
6,5
157
7,1
171
6,8
Fonte: Elaborazione Osservatorio Economico Ministero Commercio Internazionale su dati ISTAT
Mobilization of textiles-related associations
A great deal of relevant T&C associations and trade unions urged the forward step and measures of the EU to tackle with the EU enlargement in May of 2004 and removal of quota in 2005 since Italy had foreseen the calamity in its T&C sector before phase-out of ATC.[18]
On 21 February 2005, Confartigianato-Moda was the first warning that 100,000 jobs would be lost due to removal of quotas to Chinese textiles.[19] The Italian dominant textiles-Fashion sector, Smi-Ati (il Sistema Moda Italiana e l’Associazione Tessile Italiana, and then names Federazione Imprese Tessili e Moda Italiane)[20] and CNA (Confederazione Nazionale Dell’Artigianato e Della Piccola e Media Impresa) joined the line to call for emergent measures against flooded Chinese garments.
Femca Cisl, Filtea Cgil and Uilta-Uil are three major trade unions in Italy. In 2004 they hammered out some proposals about trade and industrial policy in order to tackle with the growing unemployment and dislocation in T&C sector.[21] Owing to phase-out of ATC job loss in Italian T&C sector was getting worse. Some companies like Marzotto SpA, owner of the Hugo Boss label, Gucci, Cavalli, Fendi held a strong manifestation in Prato called by three trade unions and guided by general sectary of Cisl Savino Pezzotta in 8 March of 2005. The aim was to push the pressure on Italian government to take the decision on anti-dumping measure on Chinese goods and also protest for de-localization of Italian textile industry.
Giovanni Nenciarini, president of Confartigianato di Prato and Carlo Longo, president of Prato Industrial Union pointed out the difficulty of failing to face the Chinese challenge that 74 % of their companies had less than 5 employees and they lost 5,000 employees of textile sector in two years. Badly, the export dropped from 3.300 million of euro of 2001 to 2.577 of 2003.[22] Valeria Fedeli, European Trades Union Federation: Textiles, Clothing and Leather and General Sectary of Italian trade union (Filtea Cgil) on the side of producers had called for the intervention from Italian government to curb the job loss in T&C sector.[23] Luca Rinfreschi, president of Chamber of commerce of Prato on behalf of textile producers provided that it is difficult for them to compete with China because their factories have no more than 100 or 200 employees. The sectary of local Filtea-Cgil, Manuele Manigolli put into doubt that if Chinese textile sector gets the state subsidy. Another group like Commissione di Studio sui Distretti Produttivi Italiani advocated to cap Chinese garments. According to them, the unfair Chinese challenge to Italian textiles has led to the damage of Italian exportation.[24]
Meanwhile, Filtea-Cgil was not only seeking the help from the Italian government but also from European level to accelerate the procedure of employing safeguard against China.[25] Fashion Association and trade union of textile sector (Le Associazioni di categoria della filiera della moda e le Organizzazioni Sindacali del settore) lobby Italian government and the Commission to protect not only their interest but also that of European market.[26]
Tuscany is a traditional textile-producing region in Italy. Claudio Martini, President of Tuscany Region said that he had met with Italian vice minister of produce activity and Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson to present deeply concern on the issue of textile crisis. He further unified other European textile-producing regions and cites in line with pushing pressure on the European Commission.[27] Moreover, he went to China in June of 2005 to discuss the issues on textiles and footwear sectors.
Italian producers association cooperated with EURATEX (The European Apparel and Textile Organization)
Since Italy has strong T&C industry it no wonder plays a relevant role in the European Apparel and Textile Organization (EURATEX).[28] The Italian textiles-Fashion sector sent a message to the Commission through Euratex. Euratex, for its part, made an ardent plea to the Commission on 9 March for safeguard measures. Received the request for safeguards against certain Chinese textile imports presented by Euratex, Commissioner Mandelson started the assessment. The Commission first published guidelines that would clarify under what circumstances it would consider Textiles-Specific Safeguard Clause (TSSC) action against textile and clothing imports from China.[29] On 14 April Peter Mandelson met with representatives of the Italian textile industry and Euratex to discuss the safeguards against Chinese textile exports.[30]
Italian textile and clothing producers showed their influence by unifying all relevant associations not only at national level but also European level. This advocating coalition was so powerful that trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson needed to placate Italian textile producers in Florence.[31] When EU decided to release Chinese clothing blocked in the port, Italy was angry at the EU’s conduct.[32]
Even in June of 2007 Peter Mandelson decided to quit the quota he had sent a letter to Italy’s best- selling newspaper, Corriere della Serra to explain current situation.[33]
During two years and half of breathing time (quota against China until the end of 2007), Italian producers tended to extend the period of quota against China for one year and transfer its rules, like adopting trademark of original country, fighting with counterfeit and so on to European law.[34] Furthermore, the Commission accepted the Italian proposal of obligatory trademark of original country of extra-EU in 16 December 2005.[35]
Opposite position of Italian retailers and consumer association
Despite the phase-out of ATC and removal of quota, retailers lost amount of money from this event. United Colors of Benetton and Sisley, big Italian clothing producers and retailers was a victim.[36] Paolo Banfi, President of textile machinery manufacturers textile machinery industry (ACIMIT)[37], had 19 percent of Italian textile machine exports went to China, call for quitting the quota.[38] In addition, Italian consumer association took side with retailers.[39] Commission of European Consumer Consultative Group supported the action of Italian consumer association. Italian consumer association on behalf of consumers wrote a letter to Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson to consider consumers’ benefit.[40]
In spite of their close business connection with China Italian government was hardly to stand on their side. The voice of Italian retailers cannot be heard by national government due to national interest, so Italian retailers turned to European level and sided with European retailer associations.[41] Some examples can be cited: the European Association of National Organizations of Textile Retailers (AEDT), which represents 400,000 retailers in Europe, urged in a statement that a solution be found without delay.[42] Other relevant importers and retailers are represented by the Brussels-based associations, for instance Eurocommerce, the Foreign Trade Association (FTA) and the European Association of Fashion Retailers supported by big retailer companies such as Carrefour, Metro, Inditex, Esprit Europe and Adidas.[43]
The reaction of Italian institutions
The action taken by Italian Parliament
To curb illegal Chinese goods Italian House of Representatives approved in 7 June of 2005 the application of obligatory trademark (Made in Italy).[44] The members of parliament lashed out the Chinese textile products by the data of Euratex claiming that those products had increased 46,5 percent and thus urged the government to apply the sanction at the European level in order to protect the national industry.[45] During the break time that EU imposed quota against China, Italian parliament at home has ruled the obligatory trademark, fighting against counterfeit and monitoring of imported textiles and clothing goods in order to take further measures to protect Italian textile industry from the Chinese challenge.[46] Italian parliament also urged government to transfer above measures it approved into European rules.
Action taken by Italian Government (Before first agreement with China)
Italian government was under the pressure of large numbers of associations and textile producers. Italian Minister of Productive Activities (Il ministro delle attività produttive) Antonio Marzano, wrote to Peter Mandelson to call for safeguard.[47] Minister of Economics, Giulio Tremonti also consented to safeguard.[48] Minister of Labor and Welfare, Roberto Maroni sharing the same position with his party (Lega Nord), proposed to apply anti-dumping measure.
Italian Deputy Minister of Productive Activities, Adolfo Urso met American undersecretary of Trade, Grant Aldonas talking about the monitor system of Chinese textile products.[49] Mr. Urso on behalf of Italian textile sectors argued that the anti-dumping tariff allowed by the Clause of Safeguards could be applied by the Commission to curb Chinese goods.[50] Adolfo Urso visited Peter Mandelson talking primarily about the impact of Chinese textile imports on European and Italian manufacturers in the wake of the removal of textile quotas on January 1 2005. Later on 16 March, Adolfo Urso exhorted Peter Mandelson to impose quotas on Chinese-origin textiles and clothing garments. Italian government already sent a letter earlier in March 2005 officially requesting safeguard measures, along with Portugal, citing that the Community industry is at grave risk of injury.[51] The European Commission has said it was considering steps to slow Chinese textile imports, fearing they may grossly exceed levels over the past few years when they were restricted by quotas.[52]
After the first agreement reached by both sides Italian Deputy Minister of Productive Activities, Adolfo Urso was content with the Sino-EU agreement in June of 2005. Meanwhile, Italian Premier, Silvio Berlusconi announced the victory in Senate that the Commission would employ safeguard to protect 20 categories of textiles and clothing.[53] But, two months later EU was forced to sign the other agreement with China to release the stockpiles of textiles and clothing goods in the European port. Northern League, as its part, claimed the wrongdoing of the EU, for instance Roberto Cota, under-sectary of Ministry of Productive Activities required furiously Italian Premier, Berlusconi to interfere this event.[54]
A spokesman for the Italian government over the issue of release of shipments said Italy was ready to the compromise with other EU Member States.[55] Mr. Urso in a statement on 25 August argued that we are reaching the maximum import quota for several types of Chinese textile items, but there is a clear sign that Chinese textile exports will have taken over one third of the European market by the end of 2007. Mr Urso considered that Italy’s textile sector is alive and kicking thanks to the quantitative restriction.[56] As a result, Mr Urso stated the position of Italian government is to bring China’s 2006 export quotas forward to the year of 2005.[57] After all, Italy was seeking the support from the France and other textile producing countries.
In the period of breathing time (September 2005-the end of 2007) Italy sought to impose Italian law with regard to protect T&C sector to the European level. Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi received at Palazzo Chigi with a delegation of SMI-ATI and other associations, including Paolo Zegna (President), Michele Tronconi (Acting Vice President and President of Euratex) and Gianfranco Di Natale (General Director) concerning about the recovery of T&C sector.[58]
As the phase-out of quota was coming again Italian Minister for International Commerce and European Policies Emma Bonino (May of 2006-January 2008) on 5 June 2007 claimed to extend a further year of the period of quota against China due to the expiry in the end of 2007.[59] Italian proposal is advocated by Portugal, France, Union des Industries Textiles (Uit), Euratex, the man-made fibre industry body (CIRFS), AIUFFASS (users of man-made filament yarns and silks) and Eurocoton.[60] However, such idea was never a popular solution accepted by all EU Member States, in particular North Club. Hence, the opposite attitude of the importing countries turned Italy to support double-check monitor system.[61] At least, Emma Bonino ensured Italian position on 31 July 2007 of accepting double-check monitor system because a majority of EU Member States was in favor of so-called system.[62]
Conclusions
Considering T&C sector is vital for Italy, thence Italian government gave way to taking the protectionist decision to meet the need of trade union, textile producers and employees. A great deal of societal roles was involved in the textile event at not only national level but at European level, because the initiative of the Commission, the outcome of negotiation and the final say of the Council about Sino-EU textile dispute will affect the benefit of many parts involved in this issue. Owing to the vital interest of T&C sector, Italy as a pioneer made an attempt to impose the quota against China and beefed up its influence to the European level is understandable. The outcome of Sino-EU negotiation marked the victory not only of Italy but the EU Member States of textile producers. On the one hand, Italy successfully aligned other Member States to defend their national interest. On the other hand, this event indicated the importance of domestic factors to the international negotiation. Even though there was opposite voice against protectionism within Italy textile producers still can achieve their aim by forming a big advocating coalition not only from national level but European level to affect national government and the Commission.
Under the pressure of strong Italian textile associations and trade unions, Italian government was keen to support them in the wake of the interest of the T&C sector as national interest, even though Italian retailers and importers have close business with China. The voice of Italian retailers cannot be heard by national government due to national interest, so Italian retailers turned to European level and sided with European retailer associations. On 8 March Italian Productive Activities Minister Antonio Marzano told that the data from the first two months of monitoring were alarming and Italy has raised the issue of the problems for the textiles and clothing industry. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi raised the issue again at the spring EU summit on March 22-23.
Strong European textile producers led by Italy and Euratex successfully affected the European decision to impose the quota against China by ardently lobbying the Commission, European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Italian textile producers, textile associations and trade unions did a fantastic job to reintroduce the quota that Trade Commissioner had promised not to go back. With successful mobilization of Italy, 13 EU Member States including South European Countries and Central-East Countries under the pressure of European textile producers urged to impose quota. Despite removal of the quota imposed on Chinese garments was decided in October of 2007 Italy had done a range of safeguards to defend its interest from Chinese threat in the near future.
The T&C sector, one of major pillars of Italian economy is experiencing a tough crisis facing the liberalization of this sector and the emergence of made in Chinitaly that the products with low quality but made by Chinese immigrants in Italy. Until now, Italy has successfully imposed the origin mark system into European law with the help of friends such as France, Spain and Portugal in order to deal with illegal Chinese garments. In addition, the protection of intellectual property of the European goods has been set on the European agenda against Chinese counterfactual goods. Of course, if China can respect the rules of the WTO like what Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, the president of Confindustria has said, there will not loom the trade row between the EU and the China.
Unless to say, three-level game provided a clear-cut picture in which Italian national interest was pushed from national level to the international level. With this framework a slew of national interest of each EU Member State trying to influence European and international level can be dug out with case study.
Appendix 1-The position of relevant roles about in favor of or against quota
Associations, companies Position (against)
Associations, companies Position (favor)
CNA (Confederazione Nazionale Dell’Artigianato e Della Piccola e Media Impresa)
FEDERAZIONE NAZIONALE DELLA
MODA CONFARTIGIANATO
Smi-Ati (il Sistema Moda Italiana e l’Associazione Tessile Italiana)
The Italian textiles-Fashion sector (Federazione Imprese Tessili e Moda Italiane)
3 Trade Union (Femca Cisl, Filtea Cgil and Uilta-Uil)
Fashion Association and trade union of textile sector (Le Associazioni di categoria della filiera della moda e e le Organizzazioni Sindacali del settore)
ITF (Italian Texile Fashion)
ConfCommercio
ACIMIT (Italian textile machinery manufacturers)
Italian association of consumer (Altroconsumo)
Benetton, Sisley and other retailers
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XIV LEGISLATURA, ALLEGATO B AI RESOCONTI, SEDUTA DEL 2 MAGGIO 2005. Atti Parlamentari, 19014-19020.
[1] Ph.D in Comparative and European Politics of University of Siena and Assistant Professor at Department of Italian Culture and language of Fu Jen Catholic University.
[2] When ex-French President Jacques Chirac said that there was brutal and unacceptable invasion of the
European and US markets by Chinese textiles. And when all five countries of the South Europe camp wrote to the European Commission appealing for EU’s action to end the surges of clothing imports from China meanwhile, on the contrary, government ministers from four countries of North Club (Denmark, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden) argued for ensuring the stockpiled clot Gregor, R. and Hollinger, P, “Brussels to Probe Chinese Textile Import”, Financial Times, 19 April 2005.
[3] In order to understand what Mandelson did, you have to understand that in April he was being
burned in effigy by Italian textile manufactures outside the Commission building in Brussels, see in China, Mandelson recovered his gloss”, The International Herald Tribune, September 9 2005.
[4] Fearon, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy and theories of international relations”, 289-313.
Frederick W. Mayer, “Making Domestic Differences in international negotiations: Strategic Use in
internal side-payments,” International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1992, pp. 793-818. Frederick W.
Mayer, “Domestic Politics and the Strategy of International Trade,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1991, pp. 222-246.
[5] Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 121.
[6] Milner, Resisting Protectionism: Global Industries and the Politics of International Trade, and Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations.
[7] Jongryn Mo, “Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, (Dec., 1995), pp. 914-924. Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1, New Games: Modeling Domestic- International Linkages, (Feb., 1997), pp. 117-146. Keisuke Iida, “When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, (Sep., 1993), pp. 403-426. Jongryn Mo, “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3, (Sep., 1994), pp. 402-422.
[8] The model considers international negotiations between two countries as simultaneous negotiations at both the domestic level and the international level (two negotiators from the governments). Over domestic negotiations, the government builds coalitions with societal actors; while at the international level, the government tries to implement these concerns that will have deleterious effects at home by negotiating with its counter-part. Win-sets are the main concerns in two-level game theory. Win-sets occur when the concerns of actors at both levels overlap, large win-sets make an international agreement is likely. See Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization, Vol. 42, 1988, pp. 427-460.
[9] This increase in Chinese imports is linked to a decrease in the production of T-shirts in the EU, mainly in Greece (-12%), Portugal (-30% to -50%) and Slovenia (-8%).
[10] These include pullovers, men’s trousers, blouses, t-shirts, dresses, bras, flax yarn, cotton fabrics, bed linen, as well as table and kitchen linen. See COMMISSION REGULATION (EC) No 1084/2005 of 8 July 2005 amending Annexes II, III and V to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3030/93 on common rules for imports of certain textile products from third countries.
[11] Speech by Peter Mandelson, EU – China Textiles: “Manage change and adjustment, not trade”, Speech to textile producers, Florence, Italy, 6 June 2005, SPEECH/05/325, available at < temp="sppm033_en">.
[12] The distributors argued that these shipments were done by the contracts with Chinese exporters dated from before the EU-China trade agreement. See Netherlands Germany, Denmark and Sweden asked External Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson for making import restrictions more flexible”, Agence Europe, Brussels 17 August 2005.
[13] What this system asks is that China needs to issue an export license for all exports and the EU licensing offices in the Members States will issue an import license relatively, see European Commission, The report of EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson to European Parliament about textiles: Comments on European Textiles in China and the outcome of the EU-China Summit in Beijing, Strasbourg, 13 December 2007, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm189_en.htm.
[14] The location of T&C sector is very immense. In North Italy, there are many locations in each province, for example, Trento (Borgo Valsugana), Veneto (San Bonifacio, Lonigo, Schio), in Lombardy ( Busto Arsizio, Gallarate, Como, Clusone ) and in Emilia Romagna (Correggio,Carpi, Santa Sofia); In Central Italy there are Toscana (Casentino-Val Tiberina, Empoli, Prato, Poggibonzi), In Marche (Cagli, Pergola, Ostra, Cingoli ) , in Umbria ( Assisi, Ubertide) and in Lazio (Valle del Liri); In South Italy, there are Abruzzo ( Giulianova, Teramo, Crecchio), Campania ( San Marco dei Cavoti, Calitri, Sant’Agata dei Goti, San Giuseppe Vesuviano), Basilicata (Pescopagano), Puglia ( Putignano, Martina Franca, Nardò-Gallipoli) and Sicily (Ucria-Sinagra).
[15] European Commission, “Economic and Competitiveness analysis of the European textile and clothing sector in support of the Communication: The future of the textiles and clothing sector in the enlarged Europe ”, Commission Staff Working Paper, 21/ 11 2003, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/textile/documents/sec2003_1345en.pdf.
[16] Italy had argued that it has already lost nearly 50,000 jobs in the past years (2003, 2004). The textile industry has almost 70 thousand companies and employed 570, 000 people in Italy in 2003 or one third of textile workers employed in what was then 15-state EU. This sector offers large occupation, in particular for female workers (70% of 800,000 employees).
[17] Morgando, “La Crisi del Comparto Tessile, Intervento 4 maggio 2005 dell’ on. Morgando - Dirigente Nazionale Dipartimento Politiche Industriali,” Margherita online, 01-06-2005, http://www.margheritaonline.it/dipartimenti/scheda.php?id_dipartimenti=8829&sezione=3.
[18] Commissione Europea, “La Comunicazione della Commissione delle Comunità Europee “Il futuro del settore tessile e dell’abbigliamento nell’UE allargata: Commento e valutazioni del settore TA italiano”, Milano, 23 gennaio 2004, http://www2.cna.it/servizi/cnabruxelles/servizi/Posizioni%20comuni/Tessile/Comunicato_definitivoTA.pdf.
[19] This association contains 28,000 textiles and clothing companies in Italy. It argued that Lombardian Region like Como, Sondrio, Brescia, Bergamo, Legnano, Val Canonica, Brianza and South regions like Tricase, Casarano and Nardò, have lost 6,000 employees in 4 years. In 2004 nearly 120 companies closed. See Confartigianato Newletter, http://195.103.237.153/minisiti/categorie/moda/se_moda.jsp?id=348.
[20] Smi-Ati representing about 2,000 partner companies with about 100,000 workers is one of the largest Federations.
[21] Some proposals they offered as the following: 1. Introduce the original label “Made in Italy” 2. Stand up for clamping down on counterfeit. 3. Impose the sanction. 4. Strike down the illegal importation. See “Prosegue la Mobilitazione del Sistema Moda”, Comunicato ai lavoratori: FEMCA - FILTEA – UILTA, 18 January 2005.
[22] Silvia Gambi, “La Crisi del tessile spinge a Prato tremila operai in Piazza”, L’Unità, 9/3/05; Ilaria Ciuti, “Tessile, governo e Ue si muovano”, La Repubblica, 9/3/05; Stefano Vetusti, “Operai e industriali uniti per salvare la moda: Piccolo non è più bello, il governo ci aiuti”, La Nazione, 9/3/05, also see http://www.cgil.it/FIRENZE/2005/empoli.htm.
[23] La Cina si avvicina, abolite tutte le barriere doganali, La Repubblica, 10/01/2005, available at <>.
[24] Marco Fortis, “Il punto sui Distretti Industriali”, Distretti, 21/06/2006, 18.
[25] Marco Togna, “Non dazi, ma politiche industriali”, Rassegna on line del lavoro, politica ed economica sociale, 4 November 2003, http://www.rassegna.it/2003/settori/tessile/prato.htm; “Tessile, Fedeli Export Cina: Dato Abnorme, Governo intervenga”, CGIL Ufficio Stampa, 23 March 2005, http://www.cgil.it/ufficiostampa/ufsta/ht/index.htm.
[26] Confartigianato Moda, “Petizione del comparto moda per richiedere condizioni di commercio equo e sostenibile nel settore tessile abbigliamento calzaturiero e pelletteria”, http://195.103.237.153/minisiti/categorie/moda/FedModa/Notizie/20050225pet.htm.
[27] The interview of Claudio Martini, “Impegno pieno della regione per la crisi del tessile”, L’Unità, 08/04/2005, http://presidente.regione.toscana.it/index.php?codice=10227.
[28] Interview with director of economic affairs of EURATEX, Francesco Marchi, 24 April 2006.
[29] European Commission, Guidelines for the use of safeguards on Chinese textiles exports to the EU, Brussels, 6 April 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/memo060405_en.htm.
[30] European Commission, China - Textiles: The Commission examines request for safeguards, Brussels, 14 April 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/textile/pr140405_en.htm.
[31] European Commission, “Speech by Peter Mandelson to textile producers, EU-China Textiles: Manage change and adjustment, not trade”, Palazzo della Regione, Florence, Italy, 6 June 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm033_en.htm.
[32] Notiziario CAN Federmoda, Ottobre 2005, http://www.cnacremona.it/portale/images/allegati/federmodaeu0510.pdf.
[33] “EU lifts Chinese textile quotas”, Euractiv, 10 October 2007, http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-lifts-chinese-textile-quotas/article-167516.
[34] For example, ITF (Italian Textile Fashion), group of Italian Chamber of Commerce tried to influence Italian government to support the system of monitoring of textile products sold on European Markets, see speech of Luca Mantellassi, 25 September 2006, http://www.unioncamere.eu/images/stories/doc/doc%20news%20Uc%20Bruxelles/intervento%20presidente%20mantellassi%20(2).pdf.
[35] Ersilia Monti, “Intervista ad Antonio Franceschini, secretario nazionale dell’Unione CNA Federmoda”, 02 March 2007, http://abitipuliti.org:8080/abitipuliti/news/inter.
[36] “Benetton e la crisi del tessile,” Newsletter del 25 March, 2005, http://it.supereva.com/finanzaworld/content.php?canale=analisiitalia&file=analisi_italia/2005-03-25.xml.
[37] This association represents Italian numbers approximately 300 manufacturers, with 22,000 workers and an overall annual turnover of 2,532 billion euros.
[38] Interview with Chinese diplomat of Rome in 27 May 2007, and see China’s textile machine market hot, 2004-01-20, http://www.chinademands.com/news.jhtml?method=detail&channelId=279&docId=476275.
[39] Altroconsumo is an Italian association of consumer. President of Altroconsumo, Paolo Martinello criticized that the quota against China was unacceptable because it hurt the Italian consumer’s interest.
[40] “Prodotti tessili dalla Cina. Altroconsumo: non tutto fila per il consumatore”, 13 May 2005, http://www.altroconsumo.it/map/show/12740/src/81961.htm.
[41] Interview with Italian diplomat who takes part in 133 Committee in Brussels in 25 April 2006.
[42] Chris Buckley, “China calls on Europe to ease textile quotas: Talks set to begin as containers pile up”, International Herald Tribune, 26 August 2005, http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/25/business/textile.php.
[43] Interview with servant of European Trade Commission, 24 April 2006.
[44] XIV LEGISLATURA, XIV COMMISSIONE, SEDUTA DEL 14 Settembre 2005, http://legislature.camera.it/_dati/leg14/lavori/stencomm/14/indag/iniziative_comunitarie/2005/0914/pdf001.pdf.
[45] XIV LEGISLATURA, ALLEGATO B AI RESOCONTI, SEDUTA DEL 2 MAGGIO 2005. Atti Parlamentari, 19014-19020.
[46] Mozioni sulle iniziative per favorire la tracciabilità di prodotti importati, n. 228 del 22/10/2007, http://www.camera.it/resoconti/resoconto_allegato.asp?idSeduta=0228&Resoconto=amoz02.
[47] The Italian version of his letter. «Non auspichiamo certo, signor Commissario, l’introduzione di dazi (salvo i cosiddetti dazi antidumping) quanto piuttosto la piena e puntuale applicazione di quelle misure di salvaguardia che i meccanismi comunitari contemplano a fronte di principi di fair competition da parte dei paesi terzi.
[48] “Ora sono tutti pro dazi”, L’Archivio, 19 Maggio 2005, http://jjbthearchive.wordpress.com/2005/05/19/ora-sono-tutti-pro-dazi/.
[49] TESSILE, URSO: “ITALIA E USA INSIEME PER MONITORARE IMPORT CINESE”, Comunicato Stampa del Ministero del Commercio Internazionale, Roma, 15 marzo 2005, http://www.mincomes.it/storico/news2005/marzo/cs150305.htm.
[50] Ibid, see http://www.mincomes.it/news/news2005/marzo/cs150305.htm.
[51] Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Italy, among others, pushes for textile safeguards, but Commission waits for guidelines and figures”, 31 March 2005, http://sme.tdctrade.com/sme_content.aspx?contentid=341903&src=sme_tm&sec=Textile&w_sid=194&w_pid=903&w_nid=11605&w_cid=341903&w_idt=1900-01-01&w_oid=166&w_jid=.
[52] Visit of Adolfo Urso, Italian Deputy Minister for Productive Activities, to Peter Mandelson, Audiovisual services, 16/03/2005, http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/video_search_en.cfm?videoref=&StartRow=141&keyword=mandelson&witch=video&src=1.
[53] Jake su, “Ora sono tutti pro dazi”, L’Archivio, 19 Maggio 2005, http://jjbthearchive.wordpress.com/2005/05/19/ora-sono-tutti-pro-dazi/.
[54] Luisa Grion, “Compromesso tra i Paesi della Ue. Ora l’Italia approva il via libera di Bruxelles”, La Repubblica, 6 settembre 2005, http://tradewatch.it/osservatorio/articles/art_414.html.
[55] Graham Bowley, “Retailers not thrilled by China textile deal, but EU countries likely to clear accord,” International Herald Tribune, SEPTEMBER 7, 2005,
[56] Nevertheless, Italy needs some restructuring in order to address the needs of its 800,000 employees. Italy will ask the Textile Committee to allocate part of the 2006-2013 structural funds to the textile industry. Now it needs to do just as much to protect the shoemaking industry by activating anti-dumping measures.
[57] “Italian Textile Industry Is Alive And Kicking But Needs Restructuring”, August 25 2005, http://www.tg-supply.com/article/view.html?id=13982.
[58] “Prodi meets with Smi-Ati management Tuesday 25 July”, Mare Moda news 2006, http://www.maredimoda.com/html/Read-news.30+M5a04ff9435d.0.html?&L=1.
[59] She claimed that the deadline of quota against China of Brazil, South Africa and U.S. is in the end of 2008, so if the period of quota against China of the EU is end one year before that all Chinese products in textiles and clothing would flow into EU market.
[60] Hong Kong Trade Development Council, “Chinese textile suppliers to EU unlikely to face new safeguard procedures in 2008”, 23 November 2007, http://www.tdctrade.com/imn/07112304/textiles032.htm.
[61] “Prodotti tessili cinesi: dal 2008 stop alle quote sulle esportazioni”, 30 luglio 2007, http://www.consocometa.com/index.php?Itemid=110&id=1050&option=com_content&task=view.
[62] Giseppe Sarcina, “Mandelson scrive: basta quote tessili Via libera ai cinesi”, http://www.rosanelpugno.it/rosanelpugno/node/17175.
義大利與里斯本條約
義大利與里斯本條約[1]
張孟仁 輔大義大利文系助理教授
與義大利國立Siena大學比較歐洲政治博士
壹、前 言
經過一輪馬拉松的談判後，特別是與英國、波蘭與義大利等國達成妥協後，二十七個會員國終於達成協議，於前年十月十九日凌晨，歐盟非正式領袖會議在葡萄牙首都里斯本通過了歐盟新條約《里斯本條約》，此約代表著歐盟全面整合並修訂現有各項條約，包括一九九七年的阿姆斯特丹條約與二００一年的尼斯條約，取代兩年前胎死腹中的歐洲憲法條約。新的里斯本條約出爐取代二○○五年遭荷蘭與法國選民否決的歐洲憲法，從而結束了歐盟長達六年的制憲進程，亦結束了歐盟所謂的省思期(reflection phase)。里斯本條約深具歐洲整合里程碑的意義，它的出現將大幅改變歐盟決策運作模式，使歐盟能因應歐盟在二○○四年增加更多新中東歐會員國後的需求並更能迅速因應全球問題。歐盟領導人相當重視這項改革條約，因為歐盟自二○○四年陸續納入十個新會員國，去年一月又有保加利亞和羅馬尼亞加入以來，組織規則卻未有重大革新。
本文先以介紹里斯本條約的現況、困境與其意涵起頭，續以歸納里斯本條約內容為輔，第三部分則為細究義大利對於里斯本條約的立場，原則上點出義大利從尼斯條約、歐洲憲法至里斯本條約中政黨與政府的立場，於結論再論里斯本條約可能在未來遇到的瓶頸以及未來義大利對歐洲整合的支持度。
貳、里斯本條約的現況、困境與其政經意涵
里斯本條約的出爐乃是為了矯正歐盟內部團結欲振乏力。箇中原因不乏二００三年美國發動伊拉克戰爭，造成歐盟內部分裂；二００四年歐盟由十五國東擴至二十五國，反觀歐盟在全球戰略上影響力漸趨式微。即便二００五年的歐盟憲法草案敲定推展期限與目標，歐洲公民尚難接受「憲法」層次的架構。
前年十二月十三日歐盟高峰會簽署之里斯本條約，自該月下旬至去年二月上旬，匈牙利、斯洛維尼亞、馬爾他，以及法國的國會相繼通過里斯本條約。瑞典議會繼義大利議會於去年十一月二十日投票透過歐盟里斯本條約，令瑞典成為第二十五個批准里斯本條約的歐盟會員國。[2]歐盟二十七個成員國中至今已有二十五個成員國批准里斯本條約。剩下兩個包括去年六月的愛爾蘭以全民公決方式否決里斯本條約。迄今只有捷克尚未決定是否確認該條約。[3]
里斯本條約對波蘭做了諾大妥協。早在去年6月底歐盟元首高峰會召開前，時任波蘭總理雅羅斯瓦夫‧卡欽斯基就對德國提議的新表決制度“雙重多數機制（double majority）”力表反對。[4] 卡欽斯基認為，以人口數量為基準的新投票表決方式有利于德國，卻削弱了像波蘭這樣的小國的權力。波蘭的要求在最後一刻得到其他會員國首肯，歐盟同意沿用原有的尼斯條約所規定的表決方式，即根據一國政治影響力而非基於人口數量的有效多數投票權(qualified-majority voting)。這一表決方式將沿用至2014年，並保留在2017前進一步修改的可能。其次，波蘭也獲准在歐洲法院增加一名波蘭籍大法官。即便如此，疑歐的波蘭總統卡欽斯基仍於去年七月一日表示，他不會簽署旨在簡化歐盟決策流程的里斯本條約，肇因上個月在愛爾蘭公投中遭否決後，波蘭簽署該項條約似乎已「不具意義」。波蘭國會已於去年四月批准條約，等待卡欽斯基簽署。[5] 然而情勢急轉直下，波蘭總統在七月十七日訪問法國時，旋即改口說不會讓波蘭成為批准里斯本條約的障礙，甚至還會說服捷克批准里斯本條約。[6]
里斯本條約另外行英國方便。英國堅持關於「歐盟公民基本權利憲章」的內容將不會成為英國法庭審判的基礎，也不願改變英國以判例為依據的習慣法(common law)體系獲得部分豁免。里斯本條約還同意了英國和愛爾蘭維持其在外交、司法和內政上的國家權力的要求，如規定兩國對歐盟司法合作可自願參與，其國內法可以不受歐盟法律的約束等，以免其國內的一些法律與憲章有抵觸。。
歐洲整合的邁步與否著實落於愛爾蘭的肩上。去年六月十二日，歐盟二十七個成員國之中唯一就條約舉行全民公決的愛爾蘭以46.6%贊成、53.4%反對，揚棄了里斯本條約，歐洲整合的進展再度蒙上陰影。肇因愛爾蘭憲法中明文規定，凡是所有將國家權力移轉到歐盟層級的事務，都需以公投方式諮詢民眾意見後方得為之，使得愛爾蘭成為唯一一個必須以公投來批准里斯本條約的會員國。愛爾蘭自1973年加入歐盟以來，得利於歐盟之補助甚多，如果愛爾蘭否決了這項條約的話，那對歐盟其他會員國來說，無疑是個沈重的打擊。[7]不過，愛爾蘭民眾還是繼2001年否決尼斯條約後，再度摒棄這部被視為與歐盟深化至為關鍵的條約。儘管在公投在即，支持條約的政黨，在國會的席次高達82％，僅有新芬黨〈Sinn Fein〉，這個向來強調愛爾蘭國家主權優先的政黨反對，但最後的公投結果仍差強人意。細究愛爾蘭民眾否決里斯本條約的原因，不乏兩大層面，其一是對里斯本條約本身不了解而產生的疑慮與擔憂，二則為藉此公投來表達對當前國內政經的不滿。如先前波蘭所考量般，新芬黨人害怕被稀釋主權，擔心在里斯本條約下，中小型國家將不再保證一定能在歐盟最重要的行政機構執委會內取得委員的席次，得利最多的將會是德國與擁有較多人口的東歐國家，故而使愛爾蘭處於不利地位。右派特別是傾向自由市場經濟的工商界，亦擔憂條約可能所帶來的衝擊，擔心里斯本條約規定歐盟各會員國的租稅一致化〈tax harmonisation〉將使愛爾蘭失去本身低稅率〈capital tax〉的優勢，而此一優勢正是過去數年來吸引許多美國高科技公司前往愛爾蘭投資的原因。[8]愛爾蘭總理高溫（Brian Cowen）表示，只要歐盟履行其所提出的保證，他就準備針對改革歐盟的里斯本條約再次舉行公投。
里斯本條約之所以稱為修正條約（Lisbon Treaty modifying the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community），莫過於意指修改現行的條約，並非取代。它欲彰顯民主協商、精簡組織架構，並強化決策效率。儘管對少數國家讓步太多，但不難看出對歐盟制度面的修正。歐盟（the European Union）的國際法人地位更趨穩固。新條約站在歐洲公民的立場，透過強化歐洲議會來試圖拉近歐盟機構與民眾的距離。更有甚者，歐盟主席的制度化與專職外交代表的設置，無疑將使歐盟在國際事務上「三駕馬車」的決策更有影響力。[9]
參、「里斯本條約」之內容
為因應歐盟東擴後的新會員日增，並提升歐盟決策效率及促使組織架構更趨民主，先於二００一年十二月歐盟理事會決議召集「制憲會議」。續於二００四年六月歐盟領袖高峰會上同意「歐洲憲法」（EU Constitution）草案內容，交由會員國以國內立法方式批准。惟歐洲憲法草案在2005年相繼遭法國與荷蘭公投否決，歐盟於是乎進入近3年的反省期。里斯本條約的內容承上所述乃是一個修正條約，修正要點大抵如下：
（一）各會員國針對被法荷所否決的歐盟憲法草案於2005至2007年間，提出修正意見，透過妥協與溝通後，各國領袖於二００七年十二月十三日正式簽署里斯本條約。此條約在荷蘭、英國與捷克之建議下刪除原歐洲憲法草案若干重點，其中包括︰放棄憲法一詞、去除象徵歐盟統一的國旗及國歌以及不出現外交部長頭銜等。
（二）藉由整合過去分散在各條約的共同體架構、共同外交與安全政策、司法與內政的合作來確立「歐盟」為具國際法法源的個體。取消目前每半年輪值一次的歐盟主席國(由各國領袖輪值)，改為經由選舉產生的固定職，任期兩年半之久。
（三）設立歐盟外交和安全政策高級代表一職，將目前的歐盟負責外交和安全政策的高級代表和歐盟執委會負責外交的專員這兩個有所重疊的職權合併，全面負責歐盟對外政策。
（四）精簡歐盟執委會（European Commission）組織︰自二０一四年起，由一國一代表（二十七人）改為總數包括主席、副主席共十八人。執委會主席的角色將被強化。
（五）確立雙重多數決(double majority)，並擴大實施範圍。將更多政策領域劃歸到以「有效多數決」決策的範圍，以簡化決策過程，提高決策效力，包括司法、內政等敏感領域的相關政策也將劃歸其權限下，防止成員國「一票否決」。一致決原則仍適用在稅收、社會安全、外交和防務等事關成員國主權的領域。重新調整各成員國在「有效多數決」下的加權票數，二０一四年至二０一七年的三年為過渡期之間逐步實行。以「雙重多數決」取代目前的「有效多數決」，意即相關決議必須至少獲得55%的會員國和65%的歐盟人口的同意，方才過關。[10]
（六）致力於全球性事務，如加強反恐合作，並共同改善全球暖化與能源問題等。
（七）強化歐洲議會的權力，擴大歐洲議會共同決策(codecisione, co-decision)的職權範圍。[11]不過，調整歐洲議會的總席次。議會的席次將從目前的785席減至750席，一些國家所占之席次將依其人口數量作出調整。會員國議會將在歐盟決策過程中凸顯更大作用。設若一項歐盟立法草案遭到三分之一會員國議會的反對，需退回歐盟執委會使其重新考慮。不過，為了避免超過歐盟規定的750個席次，歐洲議會議長將喪失他也鮮少使用的投票權。
肆 、義大利內部對里斯本條約的立場
義大利支持歐洲整合的立場一向鮮明，從成為歐盟創始會員國迄今，其國內民意對歐洲整合的支持度一向高昂。[12] 從早先積極支持歐洲整合的屢屢行動、到二０００年十二月的尼斯條約，參眾議院幾乎給予全數的支持，迄至阿瑪托(Giuliano Amato)擔任歐洲憲法起草籌備副主席[13]即可看出端倪。[14] 即使義大利是老牌支持歐盟的典範，不過義大利內部仍有幾股疑歐的力量，試圖阻撓歐洲整合。
(一) 政黨對歐洲整合的態度
大抵而言，八０年代末期所成立的政黨，如貝魯斯科尼的義大利前進黨與波西(Umberto Bossi)的北方聯盟(Lega Nord, Northern League party)對歐盟的親和力相對於其他老牌政黨來的少一點。[15] 其次，中間偏左政黨又會比中間偏右政黨更貼近歐盟一些。[16] 誠如柯塔(Maurizio Cotta)所言，因為貝魯斯科尼的義大利前進黨，菲尼的國家聯盟黨與波西的北方聯盟與傳統的歐洲政黨並無深厚淵源，因此對歐盟的歸屬感並非像其他政黨來的深厚，不似中間派的執政聯盟中的天主教民主聯盟(Uniione Democratica Cristiana, UDC)因承繼天主教民主黨的衣缽較支持歐洲整合路線。[17] 此外，結盟間的政黨也未必有對歐洲整合有一定的共識。[18]
目前中間偏右的執政聯盟對歐洲整合的立場可從貝魯斯科尼2001-2006年執政時多少看出端倪。時任外長魯傑羅(Renato Ruggiero)標榜親歐路線，卻遭當時執政聯盟內部的北方聯盟與某些義大利前進黨的官員打著反歐旗幟掣肘，跟執政聯盟不同調。[19] 當時貝魯斯科尼內閣中的部長各彈其調，貝魯斯科尼總理則是個人外交色彩濃厚，時而假借歐洲整合來標榜己身功勳，時而跟隨美國試圖與德法作對。[20] 還好在支持尼斯條約與歐洲憲法等推動歐洲事務方面都恰符合他個人喜好，欲藉通過條約來大鳴大放其功勳。另一方面，身為副總理的菲尼(Gianfranco Fini 第二執政大黨領袖)也傾向於支持歐洲憲法。由於執政的兩大政黨傾向於支持歐洲整合，相形之下，迫使對歐洲整合向有疑慮的北方聯盟需從而配合。[21] 值得一提的是，儘管參與談判歐洲憲法的義大利代表團成員間有不同意見，義大利大抵是樂見歐洲憲法誕生。[22] 其他由普羅迪(Romano Prodi)領軍的左派政黨，除卻重建共黨之外，基本上支持歐洲整合的態度勝過中間偏右的政黨。(表一)說明了中間偏右的政黨如前進黨、國家聯盟與北方聯盟對於歐洲整合的態度並非相當熱衷；左派民主黨(現已整合為民主黨)向來支持歐洲整合。
(二) 義大利的內部因素與對里斯本條約的考量
義大利醉心於歐洲整合，卻難免需考量國內利益。普羅迪帶領下的義大利不願席次落後於英法，而新條約竟讓義國在歐洲議會席次少於法國及英國。最後歐盟與義大利達成協議，義大利將再獲一席，與英國席次相當，比法國少一席。最終義大利獲得七十三個席次。
由於有關波蘭投票權的爭議，加上義大利要求在歐洲議會擁有更多席次，條約曾一度受到阻礙，里斯本條約的出爐，差點未能順利過關。在此次舉行的歐盟里斯本高峰會期間，義大利和波蘭雙雙在最後一刻反對歐盟里斯本條約的國家，迄至義大利獲得在歐洲議會中增加一個席位，波蘭另外取得保證對未來歐盟決策更有影響力，協商方才達成。
義大利國內政黨對歐盟支持度的分歧性不大，通常是極左(重建共黨)與極右(北方聯盟)政黨對歐盟的存在抱持疑慮。義大利國內僅有北方聯盟對里斯本條約喊出全民公決的口號，不過未得到多數響應。[23] 相較於三年前左派政黨如重建共黨(PRC)與民主共黨(PdCI)基於同樣理由，在義大利參眾議院針對歐洲憲法投下反對票。北方聯盟反歐情結嚴重，認為國家主權無需掌握在數百公里遠的比京。[24] 北方聯盟黨魁波西反對將權力上繳歐盟。北方聯盟在參議院的黨鞭布里科羅(Bricolo)表態不歡迎土耳其的加入將歐盟穆斯林化，亦不希望成為布魯塞爾的奴隸。[25] 北方聯盟在參議院的黨鞭柯塔(Roberto Cotta)大聲疾呼以全民公決來檢驗里斯本條約在國內的支持度。此疑歐政黨在參議院與眾議院提交將里斯本條約交付全民公決的法案，表達他們不滿的心聲。
北方聯盟反對簽署里斯本條約，卻遭外長弗拉提尼(Franco Frattini)在盧森堡所參加的歐盟外長會議上反駁，力陳歐洲整合的重要性，要求義大利盡快通過對里斯本條約的批准。[26] 外長弗拉提尼強調里斯本條約不會改變歐盟權力現狀，只會加速決策速度。總理貝魯斯科尼試圖警告北方聯盟莫阻撓里斯本條約的簽署。[27]
中間偏左派聯盟中如民主黨(Democratic Party)、義大利價值黨(Italy of Values)與基督民主聯盟(christian democrat Udc)則採親歐路線。中間偏右聯盟(自由人民黨)內貝魯斯科尼的政黨與右翼的國家聯盟(Alleanza Nazionale, National Alliance)表態支持里斯本條約。北方聯盟雖是總理貝魯斯科尼聯合政府的組成政黨之一，只是其一貫疑歐的立場促使它與執政聯盟其他政黨採對立立場。反對歐盟的北方聯盟(Lega Nord, Northern League)議員在表決中支持里斯本條約，但當其他議員起立鼓掌時，他們保持坐姿，乃因他們要求將里斯本條約交付公投的主張未能如願。民主黨籍的眾議員菲雅諾 (Emanuele Fiano)為此甚至故意起身對北方聯盟的議員們叫囂，以示不滿。檢視北方聯盟投贊成票的箇中原因乃應是北方聯盟盤算無需為了此事跟貝魯斯科尼唱反調，再者，連疑歐的英國上議院都投下贊成票。鑒於此，波西率先呼籲北方聯盟投下贊成票，儘管當時第二把手卡特隆尼強調愛爾蘭否決里斯本條約，意味著里斯本條約將不復存在。[28] 因此，僅是先前叫囂反對批准里斯本條約，卻未在投票關鍵時刻投下反對票。北方聯盟在眾議院的發言人科塔(Roberto Cota)強調，他們投下贊成票乃是期待里斯本條約僅是歐洲整合的一個民主小改革，不希望移交主權。[29] 眾議院議長菲尼(Gianfranco Fini)認為義大利議會開啟了嶄新的扉頁。總理貝魯斯科尼視此為重大的勝利。外長弗拉堤尼(Franco Frattini)宣稱義大利是其他尚未批准條約歐盟會員國的典範，且再度證明義大利支持歐洲整合不遺餘力。其他分別隸屬於民主黨(PD)、基督民主聯盟(UDC)與義大利價值黨(IDV)的眾議員紛紛投下贊成票。參議院最終也在北方聯盟投下贊成票後，全體一致過關。[30] 基本上，一致決通過條約的批准在在顯示出義大利內部少數反歐的立場有所收斂。
義大利是歐盟內第二十四個批准里斯本條約的會員國。義大利眾議院於去年七月三十一日以五百五十一票全數透過批准里斯本條約，七月二十三日參議院亦以全數兩百八十六票悉數通過批准該約。[31] 總理貝魯斯科尼進而表示，義大利議會批准歐盟里斯本條約表明了義大利持續推動歐洲整合進程的努力與決心。義大利總統拿坡里塔諾(Giorgio Napolitano)當天對義大利議會的表決結果甚是滿意。他企盼在今年六月在歐洲議會選舉前歐盟各會員國能全數完成對里斯本條約的批准。
歷經愛爾蘭否決里斯本條約後，北方聯盟黨主席波西認為，設若義大利針對里斯本條約舉辦公投，應該會落至跟愛爾蘭民意一樣的下場。波西直陳儘管愛爾蘭從歐盟獲致大筆援助，民意仍然否決里斯本條約，相當程度暗示金錢難以購買自由。屬北方聯盟的法規簡化部長卡特隆尼(Roberto Calderoli, Ministro per la Semplificazione normativa)主張里斯本條約生效的基本條件必須是經由全部二十七個會員國簽署才算數，藉此凸顯批准里斯本條約的困難度。[32] 其他政黨領袖如民主黨黨魁維特隆尼(Walter Veltroni)[33]、總統、總理與外長紛紛表示擔心歐洲整合的進程。[34]
伍、結論
歐盟憲法於2005年相繼在法國與荷蘭的公投中觸礁後，迫使歐盟各國展開多次的協商以尋求化解當前之僵局，並終於在二００七年底取得共識。不過細究內容，與歐洲憲法雷同卻甚少有實質意義的濃縮與修改，僅將「歐盟外長」一詞，修改為「負責外交、國防和安全事務的高級代表」，藉以減低各會員國在主權上的疑慮，另外訂出特別條款讓英國可自行決定是否接受其國內司法和內政事務參與外，其它著墨於強化歐洲議會與各會員國議會對歐盟事務的權力，設置常任歐盟輪值主席甚至國旗、國歌等事項則幾乎毫無變化，因此有人戲稱兩者的相似度甚至高達95％以上，只是冠以里斯本條約的名稱以舊瓶新酒上市。藉里斯本條約來說服已公投失敗的法荷二國重新接受，並安撫將歐盟憲法視為侵犯主權的洪水猛獸的英國與捷克。再者，以條約之名，行規避公投之實，確保里斯本條約在今年年一月一日前順利地以國會表決的方式通過。
歐盟對內面臨來自憲法危機所引起最大困局，對外則需應付全球化與新興經濟體快速崛起的強大壓力。里斯本條約的出爐即為凝聚與爭取歐洲內部民意對歐洲整合的支持與認同，改變歐盟在國際上欲振乏力的影響力。然而，愛爾蘭在去年六月十二日的當頭棒喝，無疑對此澆了一桶冷水。不可諱言，致力於歐洲整合時，得適度讓渡國家主權、調和各國利益。里斯本條約中諸多措施實可加速歐盟運作與決策，使歐盟的國際地位提昇。
此外，基於國家特殊利益考量，英國、義大利與波蘭競相爭取歐盟對其讓步，使里斯本條約內夾雜妥協，留下許多模糊空間，將為整合的進程帶來不確定性，但終究還是往前邁進了一大步。就連歐盟創始會員國與醉心於歐洲整合的義大利需要為爭取一席歐洲議會的席次，不惜杯葛里斯本條約，而且帶頭爭取的是曾任五年執委會主席的歐洲主義者普羅迪，或多或少可以解讀成國家利益還是凌駕於歐盟之上。還好的是，老牌會員國義大利推動整合的心不減，在參眾兩院同意下批准了里斯本條約，同時拜英國上議院通過里斯本條約之賜，疑歐的北方聯盟方才勉強地配合成全。整體而言，義大利內部仍以支持歐洲整合的人士居多，貝魯斯科尼與義大利外長顯示出捍衛里斯本條約的決心。重建共黨與北方聯盟則是採疑歐路線的常客。此次的中間偏右的聯盟相較於貝魯斯科尼2001-2006年時的政府在支持歐洲整合的立場上有長足的進步。值得一提的是貝氏本人的遠歐行徑有所收斂，願意為了推動里斯本條約而警告執政聯盟中的北方聯盟。在反對力量勢單力薄下，北方聯盟選擇低頭。咸信不久的未來，義大利在支持愛爾蘭批准里斯本條約上應該會不遺餘力，儘管北方聯盟仍會持續表達反對歐盟的立場，不過其影響力應該會隨著貝魯斯科尼推動歐洲整合信念逐漸加深下而減弱。值得注意的是，北方聯盟在近期選舉在北義大幅度獲得8.3%的得票率，此高支持率將會對貝魯斯科尼所領導的中右政府投下未爆彈，產生政治勒索效應。值得吾人觀察是否貝魯斯科尼剛燃起支持歐洲的熱情會受到影響。
誠如法國前總統季斯卡（Valery Giscard）與執委會前主席戴洛（Jacques Delors）等歐洲聯邦主義者認為︰排除原有的社會憲章以及歐盟國旗、國歌使得里斯本條約似乎遠離歐洲統合的理想。再者，條約妥協的作法也為未來歐盟的運作埋下不定時炸彈。儘管設置常設主席與外交代表，但在二十七個會員國各有盤算下，整合實屬不易。最後，條約中給予會員國在若干領域自行選擇加入（opt-in）與退出（opt-out），著實讓未來歐盟整合進程再掀波濤。
(表一)主要的義大利政黨對歐洲整合的態度與偏好
歐盟的國際角色
歐盟的制度設計
歐盟擴大
歐盟單一市場
歐盟對內部的影響
**義大利前進黨Forza Italia
歐盟與北約結盟
偏好政府間主義批評現行制度表現
對俄羅斯、地中海與以色列開放
開放更大的市場
有正面亦有負面影響
**國家聯盟National Alliance
獨立的歐盟
偏好政府間主義批評現行制度表現
歐盟是基督徒之地
歐洲堡壘
有正面亦有負面影響
北方聯盟Northern League
96年之前支持獨立的歐洲，目前不明
98年前支持超國家主義，而後改為支持國家
歐盟是基督徒之地
重新引進國家稅收
96年之前是正面影響，而後一直是負面影響
*人民黨與PPI/Margherita
Margherita
獨立的歐洲
支持超國家主義
對地中海國家開放
管制資本主義
正面影響
*左派民主黨PDS/DS
獨立的歐洲
支持超國家主義
對地中海國家開放
管制資本主義
正面影響
重建共產黨Rifondazione
Comunista
沒明顯的角色
支持國家本身
對歐洲大陸開放
反對單一市場模式
負面影響
資料來源：Nicolò Conti, “Party conflict over European integration in Italy: a new dimension of party,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 2, December 2006, p.226.
*2007年10月人民黨與PPI/Margherita Margherita與左派民主黨PDS/DS合併並更名為民主黨(il Partito Democratico)
**義大利前進黨Forza Italia與國家聯盟National Alliance於2000年先組自由之家(La Casa delle Libertà,CdL)，後於2008年2月27日又更名為自由人民(Il Popolo della Libertà, PdL)。
參考文獻
一、中文部分
(一) 期刊論文
張孟仁，2008。<義大利外交政策的改變與持續：第二任貝魯斯科尼政府(2001-2006)>，《歐洲國際評論》，第四期，頁45-83。
(二) 報紙
周劭彥︰歐盟還需要里斯本條約嗎？Taiwan News財經文化周刊，請參閱以下網址：
瑞典議會確認里斯本條約」，明報，2008年11月21日。
「捷克參眾兩院決定推遲審議里斯本」，新華網，< http://news.sina.com/int/xinhuanet/105-103-102-105/2008-12-10/14503484167.html>
「歐盟里斯本條約波蘭拒簽」，聯合報，2008.07.02,
「波蘭總統180度改變立場：支持里斯本條約」，中國評論新聞網， 2008-07-17，
(三) 網際網路
廖福特，挫折產生猶豫，杯葛造成污名 歐盟與台灣公民投票之省思，新世紀智庫論壇，第四十一期，（民國九十七年三月三十），請參閱以下網址：http://www.taiwanncf.org.tw/ttforum/41/41-19.pdf
歐盟透過「里斯本條約」的政經內涵，行政院經濟建設委員會，請參閱以下網址：.
二、外文部分
(一) 專書
Adam, Roberto e Tizzano, Antonio, 2008. Lineamenti Di Diritto Dell’Unione Europea. Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore.
Daniele, Luigi, 2008. Diritto Dell’Unione Europea: Sistema Istituzionale-Ordinamento, Tutela Giurisdizionale- Competenze. Milano: Giaffre’ Editore, Terza edizione.
Di Michele, Andrea, 2008. Storia dell’Italia repubblicana (1948-2008). Milano: Garzanti.
Newell, James L. 2000. Parties and Democracy in Italy. USA: Vermont: Ashgate.
Ignazi, Piero, 2008. Partiti politici in Italia: Da Forza Italia al Partito democratico Bologna: il Mulino.
Prodi,Romano, 2008. La mia vision dei fatti: Cinque anni di governo in Europa Bologna: il Mulino.
(二) 專書論文
Aliboni,Roberto, 2003. “La politica estera del governo Berlusconi,” in Alessandro Colombo Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 81-91.
Brighi,Elisabetta, 2006. “La politica estera dell’Italia,” in Alessandro Colombo and Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 99-104.
Conti, Nicolò and Verzichelli, Luca. 2004. “La dimensione europea del discorso politico in Italia: Un’Analisi diacronica delle preferenze partitiche (1950-2001)” In Maurizio Cotta, Pierangelo Isernia and Luca Verzichelli (eds.). L’Europa in Italia. Bologna, Il Mulino. pp. 55-76.
Cotta, Maurizio, 2001. “Berlusconi alla seconda prova di governo,” in Paolo Bellucci e Martin Bull (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 161-184.
Cotta, Maurizio e Verzichelli, Luca, 2003. “IL governo Berlusconi Ⅱ alla prova,” in Jean Blondel e Paolo Segatti (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 49-71.
Greco, Ettore e Matarazzo, Raffaello, 2003. “La Convenzione Europea e il dibattito in Italia sul futuro dell’Ue,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 119-130.
Rossi, Lucia Serena, 2002. “Le posizioni dell’Italia sul futuro dell’Unione europea,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 79-90.
(三) 期刊論文
Amato,Giuliano, 2008. “Dalla convenzione al trattato di Lisbona,”Rivistadi Studi Politici Internazionali, Vol. 297, No. 1, pp. 110-115.
Brighi, Elisabetta, 2006. “One Man Alone?: A ongue duree Approch to Italy’s Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 278-297.
Conti, Nicolò, 2006. “Party conflict over European integration in Italy: a new dimension of party,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 217-233.
Isernia, Pierangelo, 2007. “Italian Mass Support for European Integration in the Formative Years,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol 47, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 383 - 410.
(四) 官方文件
il governo italiano, “L’Italia ratifica il Trattato di Lisbona,”.
(五) 報紙
Italy’s Senate approves EU treaty, EU Business, 23 July 2008,
Il trattato di Lisbona in crisi. Il Leader leghista scettico, il Corriere della sera, 14 giugno 2008.
“Trattato di Lisbona, l'Italia ratifica la Camera approva all'unanimita,’ La Repubblica, 31 luglio 2008.
“Italy's Senate approves EU treaty,” EU business, 23 July 2008.
Tremonti: da la Iranda segnale di paura, Corriere della Sera, 14 Giugno 2008,
Trattato Ue, Frattini blocca la Lega. Corriere della Sera, 16 Giugno 2008.
Berlusconi “Si’ al Trattato” Ma Lega insiste: Referendum, La Repubblica, 19 giugno 2008.
“Trattato Ue, La Lega apre Bossi: Lo voteremo anche noi,” il Corriere della sera, 19 giugno 2008,
“Ue, "No" Irlanda spacca il governo Il premier ai ministri: "Preoccupato,” La Repubblica, 13 giugno 2008.
(六) 網際網路
UE: Si a Trattato Lisbona, http://news.excite.it/politica/565190/Ue-Senato-si-a-Trattato-Lisbona
Antonio Villafranca, Il Trattato di Lisbona: fine di una crisi? Paper of ISPI, ottobre 2007, No. 63, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/pb_63_2007.pdf
[1] 本文是發表於2009年1月17日的「歐洲聯盟在全球化下的角色：機會與挑戰」研討會。作者
感謝淡江歐研所郭秋慶教授所給的寶貴建議。
[2] 瑞典議會周四經過馬拉松式的長時間辯論後，以243票贊成、39票反對、67票棄權或缺席，即三分之二的絕對多數票確認了《里斯本條約》。除聯合執政的4個政黨外，瑞典第一大反對黨社會民主黨的議員也大都投了贊成票。「瑞典議會確認里斯本條約」，明報，2008年11月21日請參閱以下網址：<>.
[3] 捷克參議院當天以多數票通過了這一決定。在前一天，由於公民民主黨、捷克和摩拉維亞共產黨議員的反對，捷克眾議院在九日召開的特別會議上未能就批准里斯本條約問題達成一致，故而決定在二００九年二月三日重新討論批准此條約的問題。其實捷克憲法法院早於去年十一月二十六日在布爾諾市作出裁決，明言里斯本條約不違背捷克憲法。這一裁決為捷克議會討論里斯本條約清除了法律障礙。「捷克參眾兩院決定推遲審議里斯本」，新華網，<>.捷克憲法法院裁定里斯本條約不違背捷克憲法後克勞斯二十五日在布爾諾憲法法院表示，如果通過里斯本條約，將會改變捷克共和國的國際地位，進而削弱捷克的主權。
[4] 此制度要求，只有代表55%以上的成員國和同時代表不少於65%歐盟人口的投票率才能通過決議。
[5] 「歐盟里斯本條約波蘭拒簽」，聯合報，2008.07.02, 請參閱以下網址：.
[6] 「波蘭總統180度改變立場：支持里斯本條約」，中國評論新聞網， 2008-07-17，請參閱以下網址：< coluid="7&kindid="0&docid="100697591">.
[7] 廖福特，挫折產生猶豫，杯葛造成污名 歐盟與台灣公民投票之省思，新世紀智庫論壇，第四十一期，（民國九十七年三月三十），請參閱以下網址：.
[8] 周劭彥︰歐盟還需要里斯本條約嗎？Taiwan News財經文化周刊，請參閱以下網址：.
[9] 歐盟透過「里斯本條約」的政經內涵，行政院經濟建設委員會，請參閱以下網址：.
[10] Roberto Adam e Antonio Tizzano, Lineamenti Di Diritto Dell’Unione Europea (Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore, 2008), p. 85.
[11] Luigi Daniele, Diritto Dell’Unione Europea: Sistema Istituzionale-Ordinamento, Tutela Giurisdizionale- Competenze (Milano: Giaffre’ Editore, Terza edizione, 2008), pp. 18-19.
[12] Pierangelo Isernia, “Italian Mass Support for European Integration in the Formative Years,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol 47, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 383 - 410. Nicolò Conti and Luca Verzichelli (2004). “La dimensione europea del discorso politico in Italia: Un’Analisi diacronica delle preferenze partitiche (1950-2001)” In Maurizio Cotta, Pierangelo Isernia and Luca Verzichelli (eds.). L’Europa in Italia. Bologna, Il Mulino: pp. 55-76.
[13] Giuliano Amato, “Dalla convenzione al trattato di Lisbona,”Rivistadi Studi Politici Internazionali, Vol. 297, No. 1 Gennaio-Marzo 2008, pp. 110-115.
[14] 眾議院中僅有重建共黨的八票反對與其他兩票棄權。E. Caiano, “Polo e Ulivo uniti, via libera al governo sull’Europa,” Corriere della Sera, 29 novembre 2001, p. 11.
[15] 貝魯斯科尼的義大利前進黨(Forza Italia)是於1993年12月臨時成軍加入1994年的大選。參閱Piero Ignazi, Partiti politici in Italia: Da Forza Italia al Partito democratico (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), pp. 60-61. 波西的北方聯盟則成立於1983年。參閱Piero Ignazi, Partiti politici in Italia: Da Forza Italia al Partito democratico, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), pp. 82-83. James L. Newell, Parties and Democracy in Italy (Vermont: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 83-87.
[16] Romano Prodi, La mia vision dei fatti: Cinque anni di governo in Europa (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), pp. 7-20.
[17] Maurizio Cotta, “Berlusconi alla seconda prova di governo,” in Paolo Bellucci e Martin Bull (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2001 ), pp. 161-184.; Maurizio Cotta e Luca Verzichelli. IL governo Berlusconi Ⅱ alla prova, in Jean Blondel e Paolo Segatti (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: iL Mulino, 2003), pp. 49-71.;Roberto Aliboni, “La politica estera del governo Berlusconi,” in Alessandro Colombo Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), pp. 81-91.
[18] Elisabetta Brighi, “La politica estera dell’Italia,” in Alessandro Colombo and Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2006), pp. 99-104. Elisabetta Brighi, “One Man Alone?: A ongue duree Approch to Italy’s Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2006, pp. 278-297.
[19] 內閣部長中，北方聯盟黨魁波西、國防部長馬堤諾(Antonio Martino)與經濟部長特列蒙帝(Giulio Tremonti)強烈質疑歐盟的作用。Lucia Serena Rossi, “Le posizioni dell’Italia sul futuro dell’Unione europea,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2002), pp. 79-90.
[20] 張孟仁，「義大利外交政策的改變與持續：第二任貝魯斯科尼政府(2001-2006)」，歐洲國際評論，第四期（民國九十七年六月），頁45-84。
[21] Ettore Greco e Raffaello Matarazzo, “La Convenzione Europea e il dibattito in Italia sul futuro dell’Ue,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), pp. 119-130.
[22] 貝魯斯科尼恰為歐盟當時的輪值主席，為求任內功勳，曾誇下海口說義大利要成為第一個通
過歐洲憲法的國家。Ibid, p. 125.
[23] Italy’s Senate approves EU treaty, EU Business, 23 July 2008,.
[24] Il trattato di Lisbona in crisi. Il Leader leghista scettico, il corriere della sera, 14 giugno 2008, <>. “Trattato di Lisbona, l'Italia ratifica la Camera approva all'unanimita,’ La Repubblica, 31 luglio 2008.. il governo italiano, “L’Italia ratifica il Trattato di Lisbona,” .
[25] UE: Si a Trattato Lisbona,.
[26] Trattato Ue, Frattini blocca la Lega. Corriere della Sera, 16 Giugno 2008, 參見.
[27] Berlusconi “Si’ al Trattato” Ma Lega insiste: Referendum,” La Repubblica, 19 giugno 2008, 參閱.
[28] “Trattato Ue, La Lega apre Bossi: Lo voteremo anche noi,” il Corriere della sera, 19 giugno 2008,
參見.
[29] Antonio Villafranca, Il Trattato di Lisbona: fine di una crisi? Paper of ISPI, ottobre 2007, No. 63,.
[30] “Italy's Senate approves EU treaty,” EU business, 23 July 2008, 參見.
[31] Il Governo Italiano, “Ratifica dell’Italia del Trattato di Lisbona,” <>.
[32] Tremonti: da la Iranda segnale di paura, Corriere della Sera, 14 Giugno 2008, 參見<>.
[33] 原本是義大利共產黨(Partito Communista Italiano)，1991年因蘇聯解體轉型更名為左派民主黨(Partito Democratico della Sinistra)。2007年人民黨與PPI/Margherita Margherita與左派民主黨PDS/DS合併並更名為民主黨(il Partito Democratico)。參閱 Andrea Di Michele, Storia dell’Italia repubblicana (1948-2008) (Milano: Garzanti, 2008), pp. 396-398.
[34] “Ue, "No" Irlanda spacca il governo Il premier ai ministri: "Preoccupato,” La Repubblica, 13 giugno 2008.
張孟仁 輔大義大利文系助理教授
與義大利國立Siena大學比較歐洲政治博士
壹、前 言
經過一輪馬拉松的談判後，特別是與英國、波蘭與義大利等國達成妥協後，二十七個會員國終於達成協議，於前年十月十九日凌晨，歐盟非正式領袖會議在葡萄牙首都里斯本通過了歐盟新條約《里斯本條約》，此約代表著歐盟全面整合並修訂現有各項條約，包括一九九七年的阿姆斯特丹條約與二００一年的尼斯條約，取代兩年前胎死腹中的歐洲憲法條約。新的里斯本條約出爐取代二○○五年遭荷蘭與法國選民否決的歐洲憲法，從而結束了歐盟長達六年的制憲進程，亦結束了歐盟所謂的省思期(reflection phase)。里斯本條約深具歐洲整合里程碑的意義，它的出現將大幅改變歐盟決策運作模式，使歐盟能因應歐盟在二○○四年增加更多新中東歐會員國後的需求並更能迅速因應全球問題。歐盟領導人相當重視這項改革條約，因為歐盟自二○○四年陸續納入十個新會員國，去年一月又有保加利亞和羅馬尼亞加入以來，組織規則卻未有重大革新。
本文先以介紹里斯本條約的現況、困境與其意涵起頭，續以歸納里斯本條約內容為輔，第三部分則為細究義大利對於里斯本條約的立場，原則上點出義大利從尼斯條約、歐洲憲法至里斯本條約中政黨與政府的立場，於結論再論里斯本條約可能在未來遇到的瓶頸以及未來義大利對歐洲整合的支持度。
貳、里斯本條約的現況、困境與其政經意涵
里斯本條約的出爐乃是為了矯正歐盟內部團結欲振乏力。箇中原因不乏二００三年美國發動伊拉克戰爭，造成歐盟內部分裂；二００四年歐盟由十五國東擴至二十五國，反觀歐盟在全球戰略上影響力漸趨式微。即便二００五年的歐盟憲法草案敲定推展期限與目標，歐洲公民尚難接受「憲法」層次的架構。
前年十二月十三日歐盟高峰會簽署之里斯本條約，自該月下旬至去年二月上旬，匈牙利、斯洛維尼亞、馬爾他，以及法國的國會相繼通過里斯本條約。瑞典議會繼義大利議會於去年十一月二十日投票透過歐盟里斯本條約，令瑞典成為第二十五個批准里斯本條約的歐盟會員國。[2]歐盟二十七個成員國中至今已有二十五個成員國批准里斯本條約。剩下兩個包括去年六月的愛爾蘭以全民公決方式否決里斯本條約。迄今只有捷克尚未決定是否確認該條約。[3]
里斯本條約對波蘭做了諾大妥協。早在去年6月底歐盟元首高峰會召開前，時任波蘭總理雅羅斯瓦夫‧卡欽斯基就對德國提議的新表決制度“雙重多數機制（double majority）”力表反對。[4] 卡欽斯基認為，以人口數量為基準的新投票表決方式有利于德國，卻削弱了像波蘭這樣的小國的權力。波蘭的要求在最後一刻得到其他會員國首肯，歐盟同意沿用原有的尼斯條約所規定的表決方式，即根據一國政治影響力而非基於人口數量的有效多數投票權(qualified-majority voting)。這一表決方式將沿用至2014年，並保留在2017前進一步修改的可能。其次，波蘭也獲准在歐洲法院增加一名波蘭籍大法官。即便如此，疑歐的波蘭總統卡欽斯基仍於去年七月一日表示，他不會簽署旨在簡化歐盟決策流程的里斯本條約，肇因上個月在愛爾蘭公投中遭否決後，波蘭簽署該項條約似乎已「不具意義」。波蘭國會已於去年四月批准條約，等待卡欽斯基簽署。[5] 然而情勢急轉直下，波蘭總統在七月十七日訪問法國時，旋即改口說不會讓波蘭成為批准里斯本條約的障礙，甚至還會說服捷克批准里斯本條約。[6]
里斯本條約另外行英國方便。英國堅持關於「歐盟公民基本權利憲章」的內容將不會成為英國法庭審判的基礎，也不願改變英國以判例為依據的習慣法(common law)體系獲得部分豁免。里斯本條約還同意了英國和愛爾蘭維持其在外交、司法和內政上的國家權力的要求，如規定兩國對歐盟司法合作可自願參與，其國內法可以不受歐盟法律的約束等，以免其國內的一些法律與憲章有抵觸。。
歐洲整合的邁步與否著實落於愛爾蘭的肩上。去年六月十二日，歐盟二十七個成員國之中唯一就條約舉行全民公決的愛爾蘭以46.6%贊成、53.4%反對，揚棄了里斯本條約，歐洲整合的進展再度蒙上陰影。肇因愛爾蘭憲法中明文規定，凡是所有將國家權力移轉到歐盟層級的事務，都需以公投方式諮詢民眾意見後方得為之，使得愛爾蘭成為唯一一個必須以公投來批准里斯本條約的會員國。愛爾蘭自1973年加入歐盟以來，得利於歐盟之補助甚多，如果愛爾蘭否決了這項條約的話，那對歐盟其他會員國來說，無疑是個沈重的打擊。[7]不過，愛爾蘭民眾還是繼2001年否決尼斯條約後，再度摒棄這部被視為與歐盟深化至為關鍵的條約。儘管在公投在即，支持條約的政黨，在國會的席次高達82％，僅有新芬黨〈Sinn Fein〉，這個向來強調愛爾蘭國家主權優先的政黨反對，但最後的公投結果仍差強人意。細究愛爾蘭民眾否決里斯本條約的原因，不乏兩大層面，其一是對里斯本條約本身不了解而產生的疑慮與擔憂，二則為藉此公投來表達對當前國內政經的不滿。如先前波蘭所考量般，新芬黨人害怕被稀釋主權，擔心在里斯本條約下，中小型國家將不再保證一定能在歐盟最重要的行政機構執委會內取得委員的席次，得利最多的將會是德國與擁有較多人口的東歐國家，故而使愛爾蘭處於不利地位。右派特別是傾向自由市場經濟的工商界，亦擔憂條約可能所帶來的衝擊，擔心里斯本條約規定歐盟各會員國的租稅一致化〈tax harmonisation〉將使愛爾蘭失去本身低稅率〈capital tax〉的優勢，而此一優勢正是過去數年來吸引許多美國高科技公司前往愛爾蘭投資的原因。[8]愛爾蘭總理高溫（Brian Cowen）表示，只要歐盟履行其所提出的保證，他就準備針對改革歐盟的里斯本條約再次舉行公投。
里斯本條約之所以稱為修正條約（Lisbon Treaty modifying the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community），莫過於意指修改現行的條約，並非取代。它欲彰顯民主協商、精簡組織架構，並強化決策效率。儘管對少數國家讓步太多，但不難看出對歐盟制度面的修正。歐盟（the European Union）的國際法人地位更趨穩固。新條約站在歐洲公民的立場，透過強化歐洲議會來試圖拉近歐盟機構與民眾的距離。更有甚者，歐盟主席的制度化與專職外交代表的設置，無疑將使歐盟在國際事務上「三駕馬車」的決策更有影響力。[9]
參、「里斯本條約」之內容
為因應歐盟東擴後的新會員日增，並提升歐盟決策效率及促使組織架構更趨民主，先於二００一年十二月歐盟理事會決議召集「制憲會議」。續於二００四年六月歐盟領袖高峰會上同意「歐洲憲法」（EU Constitution）草案內容，交由會員國以國內立法方式批准。惟歐洲憲法草案在2005年相繼遭法國與荷蘭公投否決，歐盟於是乎進入近3年的反省期。里斯本條約的內容承上所述乃是一個修正條約，修正要點大抵如下：
（一）各會員國針對被法荷所否決的歐盟憲法草案於2005至2007年間，提出修正意見，透過妥協與溝通後，各國領袖於二００七年十二月十三日正式簽署里斯本條約。此條約在荷蘭、英國與捷克之建議下刪除原歐洲憲法草案若干重點，其中包括︰放棄憲法一詞、去除象徵歐盟統一的國旗及國歌以及不出現外交部長頭銜等。
（二）藉由整合過去分散在各條約的共同體架構、共同外交與安全政策、司法與內政的合作來確立「歐盟」為具國際法法源的個體。取消目前每半年輪值一次的歐盟主席國(由各國領袖輪值)，改為經由選舉產生的固定職，任期兩年半之久。
（三）設立歐盟外交和安全政策高級代表一職，將目前的歐盟負責外交和安全政策的高級代表和歐盟執委會負責外交的專員這兩個有所重疊的職權合併，全面負責歐盟對外政策。
（四）精簡歐盟執委會（European Commission）組織︰自二０一四年起，由一國一代表（二十七人）改為總數包括主席、副主席共十八人。執委會主席的角色將被強化。
（五）確立雙重多數決(double majority)，並擴大實施範圍。將更多政策領域劃歸到以「有效多數決」決策的範圍，以簡化決策過程，提高決策效力，包括司法、內政等敏感領域的相關政策也將劃歸其權限下，防止成員國「一票否決」。一致決原則仍適用在稅收、社會安全、外交和防務等事關成員國主權的領域。重新調整各成員國在「有效多數決」下的加權票數，二０一四年至二０一七年的三年為過渡期之間逐步實行。以「雙重多數決」取代目前的「有效多數決」，意即相關決議必須至少獲得55%的會員國和65%的歐盟人口的同意，方才過關。[10]
（六）致力於全球性事務，如加強反恐合作，並共同改善全球暖化與能源問題等。
（七）強化歐洲議會的權力，擴大歐洲議會共同決策(codecisione, co-decision)的職權範圍。[11]不過，調整歐洲議會的總席次。議會的席次將從目前的785席減至750席，一些國家所占之席次將依其人口數量作出調整。會員國議會將在歐盟決策過程中凸顯更大作用。設若一項歐盟立法草案遭到三分之一會員國議會的反對，需退回歐盟執委會使其重新考慮。不過，為了避免超過歐盟規定的750個席次，歐洲議會議長將喪失他也鮮少使用的投票權。
肆 、義大利內部對里斯本條約的立場
義大利支持歐洲整合的立場一向鮮明，從成為歐盟創始會員國迄今，其國內民意對歐洲整合的支持度一向高昂。[12] 從早先積極支持歐洲整合的屢屢行動、到二０００年十二月的尼斯條約，參眾議院幾乎給予全數的支持，迄至阿瑪托(Giuliano Amato)擔任歐洲憲法起草籌備副主席[13]即可看出端倪。[14] 即使義大利是老牌支持歐盟的典範，不過義大利內部仍有幾股疑歐的力量，試圖阻撓歐洲整合。
(一) 政黨對歐洲整合的態度
大抵而言，八０年代末期所成立的政黨，如貝魯斯科尼的義大利前進黨與波西(Umberto Bossi)的北方聯盟(Lega Nord, Northern League party)對歐盟的親和力相對於其他老牌政黨來的少一點。[15] 其次，中間偏左政黨又會比中間偏右政黨更貼近歐盟一些。[16] 誠如柯塔(Maurizio Cotta)所言，因為貝魯斯科尼的義大利前進黨，菲尼的國家聯盟黨與波西的北方聯盟與傳統的歐洲政黨並無深厚淵源，因此對歐盟的歸屬感並非像其他政黨來的深厚，不似中間派的執政聯盟中的天主教民主聯盟(Uniione Democratica Cristiana, UDC)因承繼天主教民主黨的衣缽較支持歐洲整合路線。[17] 此外，結盟間的政黨也未必有對歐洲整合有一定的共識。[18]
目前中間偏右的執政聯盟對歐洲整合的立場可從貝魯斯科尼2001-2006年執政時多少看出端倪。時任外長魯傑羅(Renato Ruggiero)標榜親歐路線，卻遭當時執政聯盟內部的北方聯盟與某些義大利前進黨的官員打著反歐旗幟掣肘，跟執政聯盟不同調。[19] 當時貝魯斯科尼內閣中的部長各彈其調，貝魯斯科尼總理則是個人外交色彩濃厚，時而假借歐洲整合來標榜己身功勳，時而跟隨美國試圖與德法作對。[20] 還好在支持尼斯條約與歐洲憲法等推動歐洲事務方面都恰符合他個人喜好，欲藉通過條約來大鳴大放其功勳。另一方面，身為副總理的菲尼(Gianfranco Fini 第二執政大黨領袖)也傾向於支持歐洲憲法。由於執政的兩大政黨傾向於支持歐洲整合，相形之下，迫使對歐洲整合向有疑慮的北方聯盟需從而配合。[21] 值得一提的是，儘管參與談判歐洲憲法的義大利代表團成員間有不同意見，義大利大抵是樂見歐洲憲法誕生。[22] 其他由普羅迪(Romano Prodi)領軍的左派政黨，除卻重建共黨之外，基本上支持歐洲整合的態度勝過中間偏右的政黨。(表一)說明了中間偏右的政黨如前進黨、國家聯盟與北方聯盟對於歐洲整合的態度並非相當熱衷；左派民主黨(現已整合為民主黨)向來支持歐洲整合。
(二) 義大利的內部因素與對里斯本條約的考量
義大利醉心於歐洲整合，卻難免需考量國內利益。普羅迪帶領下的義大利不願席次落後於英法，而新條約竟讓義國在歐洲議會席次少於法國及英國。最後歐盟與義大利達成協議，義大利將再獲一席，與英國席次相當，比法國少一席。最終義大利獲得七十三個席次。
由於有關波蘭投票權的爭議，加上義大利要求在歐洲議會擁有更多席次，條約曾一度受到阻礙，里斯本條約的出爐，差點未能順利過關。在此次舉行的歐盟里斯本高峰會期間，義大利和波蘭雙雙在最後一刻反對歐盟里斯本條約的國家，迄至義大利獲得在歐洲議會中增加一個席位，波蘭另外取得保證對未來歐盟決策更有影響力，協商方才達成。
義大利國內政黨對歐盟支持度的分歧性不大，通常是極左(重建共黨)與極右(北方聯盟)政黨對歐盟的存在抱持疑慮。義大利國內僅有北方聯盟對里斯本條約喊出全民公決的口號，不過未得到多數響應。[23] 相較於三年前左派政黨如重建共黨(PRC)與民主共黨(PdCI)基於同樣理由，在義大利參眾議院針對歐洲憲法投下反對票。北方聯盟反歐情結嚴重，認為國家主權無需掌握在數百公里遠的比京。[24] 北方聯盟黨魁波西反對將權力上繳歐盟。北方聯盟在參議院的黨鞭布里科羅(Bricolo)表態不歡迎土耳其的加入將歐盟穆斯林化，亦不希望成為布魯塞爾的奴隸。[25] 北方聯盟在參議院的黨鞭柯塔(Roberto Cotta)大聲疾呼以全民公決來檢驗里斯本條約在國內的支持度。此疑歐政黨在參議院與眾議院提交將里斯本條約交付全民公決的法案，表達他們不滿的心聲。
北方聯盟反對簽署里斯本條約，卻遭外長弗拉提尼(Franco Frattini)在盧森堡所參加的歐盟外長會議上反駁，力陳歐洲整合的重要性，要求義大利盡快通過對里斯本條約的批准。[26] 外長弗拉提尼強調里斯本條約不會改變歐盟權力現狀，只會加速決策速度。總理貝魯斯科尼試圖警告北方聯盟莫阻撓里斯本條約的簽署。[27]
中間偏左派聯盟中如民主黨(Democratic Party)、義大利價值黨(Italy of Values)與基督民主聯盟(christian democrat Udc)則採親歐路線。中間偏右聯盟(自由人民黨)內貝魯斯科尼的政黨與右翼的國家聯盟(Alleanza Nazionale, National Alliance)表態支持里斯本條約。北方聯盟雖是總理貝魯斯科尼聯合政府的組成政黨之一，只是其一貫疑歐的立場促使它與執政聯盟其他政黨採對立立場。反對歐盟的北方聯盟(Lega Nord, Northern League)議員在表決中支持里斯本條約，但當其他議員起立鼓掌時，他們保持坐姿，乃因他們要求將里斯本條約交付公投的主張未能如願。民主黨籍的眾議員菲雅諾 (Emanuele Fiano)為此甚至故意起身對北方聯盟的議員們叫囂，以示不滿。檢視北方聯盟投贊成票的箇中原因乃應是北方聯盟盤算無需為了此事跟貝魯斯科尼唱反調，再者，連疑歐的英國上議院都投下贊成票。鑒於此，波西率先呼籲北方聯盟投下贊成票，儘管當時第二把手卡特隆尼強調愛爾蘭否決里斯本條約，意味著里斯本條約將不復存在。[28] 因此，僅是先前叫囂反對批准里斯本條約，卻未在投票關鍵時刻投下反對票。北方聯盟在眾議院的發言人科塔(Roberto Cota)強調，他們投下贊成票乃是期待里斯本條約僅是歐洲整合的一個民主小改革，不希望移交主權。[29] 眾議院議長菲尼(Gianfranco Fini)認為義大利議會開啟了嶄新的扉頁。總理貝魯斯科尼視此為重大的勝利。外長弗拉堤尼(Franco Frattini)宣稱義大利是其他尚未批准條約歐盟會員國的典範，且再度證明義大利支持歐洲整合不遺餘力。其他分別隸屬於民主黨(PD)、基督民主聯盟(UDC)與義大利價值黨(IDV)的眾議員紛紛投下贊成票。參議院最終也在北方聯盟投下贊成票後，全體一致過關。[30] 基本上，一致決通過條約的批准在在顯示出義大利內部少數反歐的立場有所收斂。
義大利是歐盟內第二十四個批准里斯本條約的會員國。義大利眾議院於去年七月三十一日以五百五十一票全數透過批准里斯本條約，七月二十三日參議院亦以全數兩百八十六票悉數通過批准該約。[31] 總理貝魯斯科尼進而表示，義大利議會批准歐盟里斯本條約表明了義大利持續推動歐洲整合進程的努力與決心。義大利總統拿坡里塔諾(Giorgio Napolitano)當天對義大利議會的表決結果甚是滿意。他企盼在今年六月在歐洲議會選舉前歐盟各會員國能全數完成對里斯本條約的批准。
歷經愛爾蘭否決里斯本條約後，北方聯盟黨主席波西認為，設若義大利針對里斯本條約舉辦公投，應該會落至跟愛爾蘭民意一樣的下場。波西直陳儘管愛爾蘭從歐盟獲致大筆援助，民意仍然否決里斯本條約，相當程度暗示金錢難以購買自由。屬北方聯盟的法規簡化部長卡特隆尼(Roberto Calderoli, Ministro per la Semplificazione normativa)主張里斯本條約生效的基本條件必須是經由全部二十七個會員國簽署才算數，藉此凸顯批准里斯本條約的困難度。[32] 其他政黨領袖如民主黨黨魁維特隆尼(Walter Veltroni)[33]、總統、總理與外長紛紛表示擔心歐洲整合的進程。[34]
伍、結論
歐盟憲法於2005年相繼在法國與荷蘭的公投中觸礁後，迫使歐盟各國展開多次的協商以尋求化解當前之僵局，並終於在二００七年底取得共識。不過細究內容，與歐洲憲法雷同卻甚少有實質意義的濃縮與修改，僅將「歐盟外長」一詞，修改為「負責外交、國防和安全事務的高級代表」，藉以減低各會員國在主權上的疑慮，另外訂出特別條款讓英國可自行決定是否接受其國內司法和內政事務參與外，其它著墨於強化歐洲議會與各會員國議會對歐盟事務的權力，設置常任歐盟輪值主席甚至國旗、國歌等事項則幾乎毫無變化，因此有人戲稱兩者的相似度甚至高達95％以上，只是冠以里斯本條約的名稱以舊瓶新酒上市。藉里斯本條約來說服已公投失敗的法荷二國重新接受，並安撫將歐盟憲法視為侵犯主權的洪水猛獸的英國與捷克。再者，以條約之名，行規避公投之實，確保里斯本條約在今年年一月一日前順利地以國會表決的方式通過。
歐盟對內面臨來自憲法危機所引起最大困局，對外則需應付全球化與新興經濟體快速崛起的強大壓力。里斯本條約的出爐即為凝聚與爭取歐洲內部民意對歐洲整合的支持與認同，改變歐盟在國際上欲振乏力的影響力。然而，愛爾蘭在去年六月十二日的當頭棒喝，無疑對此澆了一桶冷水。不可諱言，致力於歐洲整合時，得適度讓渡國家主權、調和各國利益。里斯本條約中諸多措施實可加速歐盟運作與決策，使歐盟的國際地位提昇。
此外，基於國家特殊利益考量，英國、義大利與波蘭競相爭取歐盟對其讓步，使里斯本條約內夾雜妥協，留下許多模糊空間，將為整合的進程帶來不確定性，但終究還是往前邁進了一大步。就連歐盟創始會員國與醉心於歐洲整合的義大利需要為爭取一席歐洲議會的席次，不惜杯葛里斯本條約，而且帶頭爭取的是曾任五年執委會主席的歐洲主義者普羅迪，或多或少可以解讀成國家利益還是凌駕於歐盟之上。還好的是，老牌會員國義大利推動整合的心不減，在參眾兩院同意下批准了里斯本條約，同時拜英國上議院通過里斯本條約之賜，疑歐的北方聯盟方才勉強地配合成全。整體而言，義大利內部仍以支持歐洲整合的人士居多，貝魯斯科尼與義大利外長顯示出捍衛里斯本條約的決心。重建共黨與北方聯盟則是採疑歐路線的常客。此次的中間偏右的聯盟相較於貝魯斯科尼2001-2006年時的政府在支持歐洲整合的立場上有長足的進步。值得一提的是貝氏本人的遠歐行徑有所收斂，願意為了推動里斯本條約而警告執政聯盟中的北方聯盟。在反對力量勢單力薄下，北方聯盟選擇低頭。咸信不久的未來，義大利在支持愛爾蘭批准里斯本條約上應該會不遺餘力，儘管北方聯盟仍會持續表達反對歐盟的立場，不過其影響力應該會隨著貝魯斯科尼推動歐洲整合信念逐漸加深下而減弱。值得注意的是，北方聯盟在近期選舉在北義大幅度獲得8.3%的得票率，此高支持率將會對貝魯斯科尼所領導的中右政府投下未爆彈，產生政治勒索效應。值得吾人觀察是否貝魯斯科尼剛燃起支持歐洲的熱情會受到影響。
誠如法國前總統季斯卡（Valery Giscard）與執委會前主席戴洛（Jacques Delors）等歐洲聯邦主義者認為︰排除原有的社會憲章以及歐盟國旗、國歌使得里斯本條約似乎遠離歐洲統合的理想。再者，條約妥協的作法也為未來歐盟的運作埋下不定時炸彈。儘管設置常設主席與外交代表，但在二十七個會員國各有盤算下，整合實屬不易。最後，條約中給予會員國在若干領域自行選擇加入（opt-in）與退出（opt-out），著實讓未來歐盟整合進程再掀波濤。
(表一)主要的義大利政黨對歐洲整合的態度與偏好
歐盟的國際角色
歐盟的制度設計
歐盟擴大
歐盟單一市場
歐盟對內部的影響
**義大利前進黨Forza Italia
歐盟與北約結盟
偏好政府間主義批評現行制度表現
對俄羅斯、地中海與以色列開放
開放更大的市場
有正面亦有負面影響
**國家聯盟National Alliance
獨立的歐盟
偏好政府間主義批評現行制度表現
歐盟是基督徒之地
歐洲堡壘
有正面亦有負面影響
北方聯盟Northern League
96年之前支持獨立的歐洲，目前不明
98年前支持超國家主義，而後改為支持國家
歐盟是基督徒之地
重新引進國家稅收
96年之前是正面影響，而後一直是負面影響
*人民黨與PPI/Margherita
Margherita
獨立的歐洲
支持超國家主義
對地中海國家開放
管制資本主義
正面影響
*左派民主黨PDS/DS
獨立的歐洲
支持超國家主義
對地中海國家開放
管制資本主義
正面影響
重建共產黨Rifondazione
Comunista
沒明顯的角色
支持國家本身
對歐洲大陸開放
反對單一市場模式
負面影響
資料來源：Nicolò Conti, “Party conflict over European integration in Italy: a new dimension of party,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 2, December 2006, p.226.
*2007年10月人民黨與PPI/Margherita Margherita與左派民主黨PDS/DS合併並更名為民主黨(il Partito Democratico)
**義大利前進黨Forza Italia與國家聯盟National Alliance於2000年先組自由之家(La Casa delle Libertà,CdL)，後於2008年2月27日又更名為自由人民(Il Popolo della Libertà, PdL)。
參考文獻
一、中文部分
(一) 期刊論文
張孟仁，2008。<義大利外交政策的改變與持續：第二任貝魯斯科尼政府(2001-2006)>，《歐洲國際評論》，第四期，頁45-83。
(二) 報紙
周劭彥︰歐盟還需要里斯本條約嗎？Taiwan News財經文化周刊，請參閱以下網址：
瑞典議會確認里斯本條約」，明報，2008年11月21日。
「捷克參眾兩院決定推遲審議里斯本」，新華網，< http://news.sina.com/int/xinhuanet/105-103-102-105/2008-12-10/14503484167.html>
「歐盟里斯本條約波蘭拒簽」，聯合報，2008.07.02,
「波蘭總統180度改變立場：支持里斯本條約」，中國評論新聞網， 2008-07-17，
(三) 網際網路
廖福特，挫折產生猶豫，杯葛造成污名 歐盟與台灣公民投票之省思，新世紀智庫論壇，第四十一期，（民國九十七年三月三十），請參閱以下網址：http://www.taiwanncf.org.tw/ttforum/41/41-19.pdf
歐盟透過「里斯本條約」的政經內涵，行政院經濟建設委員會，請參閱以下網址：
二、外文部分
(一) 專書
Adam, Roberto e Tizzano, Antonio, 2008. Lineamenti Di Diritto Dell’Unione Europea. Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore.
Daniele, Luigi, 2008. Diritto Dell’Unione Europea: Sistema Istituzionale-Ordinamento, Tutela Giurisdizionale- Competenze. Milano: Giaffre’ Editore, Terza edizione.
Di Michele, Andrea, 2008. Storia dell’Italia repubblicana (1948-2008). Milano: Garzanti.
Newell, James L. 2000. Parties and Democracy in Italy. USA: Vermont: Ashgate.
Ignazi, Piero, 2008. Partiti politici in Italia: Da Forza Italia al Partito democratico Bologna: il Mulino.
Prodi,Romano, 2008. La mia vision dei fatti: Cinque anni di governo in Europa Bologna: il Mulino.
(二) 專書論文
Aliboni,Roberto, 2003. “La politica estera del governo Berlusconi,” in Alessandro Colombo Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 81-91.
Brighi,Elisabetta, 2006. “La politica estera dell’Italia,” in Alessandro Colombo and Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 99-104.
Conti, Nicolò and Verzichelli, Luca. 2004. “La dimensione europea del discorso politico in Italia: Un’Analisi diacronica delle preferenze partitiche (1950-2001)” In Maurizio Cotta, Pierangelo Isernia and Luca Verzichelli (eds.). L’Europa in Italia. Bologna, Il Mulino. pp. 55-76.
Cotta, Maurizio, 2001. “Berlusconi alla seconda prova di governo,” in Paolo Bellucci e Martin Bull (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 161-184.
Cotta, Maurizio e Verzichelli, Luca, 2003. “IL governo Berlusconi Ⅱ alla prova,” in Jean Blondel e Paolo Segatti (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 49-71.
Greco, Ettore e Matarazzo, Raffaello, 2003. “La Convenzione Europea e il dibattito in Italia sul futuro dell’Ue,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 119-130.
Rossi, Lucia Serena, 2002. “Le posizioni dell’Italia sul futuro dell’Unione europea,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale. Bologna: il Mulino, pp. 79-90.
(三) 期刊論文
Amato,Giuliano, 2008. “Dalla convenzione al trattato di Lisbona,”Rivistadi Studi Politici Internazionali, Vol. 297, No. 1, pp. 110-115.
Brighi, Elisabetta, 2006. “One Man Alone?: A ongue duree Approch to Italy’s Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 278-297.
Conti, Nicolò, 2006. “Party conflict over European integration in Italy: a new dimension of party,” Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 217-233.
Isernia, Pierangelo, 2007. “Italian Mass Support for European Integration in the Formative Years,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol 47, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 383 - 410.
(四) 官方文件
il governo italiano, “L’Italia ratifica il Trattato di Lisbona,”
(五) 報紙
Italy’s Senate approves EU treaty, EU Business, 23 July 2008,
Il trattato di Lisbona in crisi. Il Leader leghista scettico, il Corriere della sera, 14 giugno 2008.
“Trattato di Lisbona, l'Italia ratifica la Camera approva all'unanimita,’ La Repubblica, 31 luglio 2008.
“Italy's Senate approves EU treaty,” EU business, 23 July 2008.
Tremonti: da la Iranda segnale di paura, Corriere della Sera, 14 Giugno 2008,
Trattato Ue, Frattini blocca la Lega. Corriere della Sera, 16 Giugno 2008.
Berlusconi “Si’ al Trattato” Ma Lega insiste: Referendum, La Repubblica, 19 giugno 2008.
“Trattato Ue, La Lega apre Bossi: Lo voteremo anche noi,” il Corriere della sera, 19 giugno 2008,
“Ue, "No" Irlanda spacca il governo Il premier ai ministri: "Preoccupato,” La Repubblica, 13 giugno 2008.
(六) 網際網路
UE: Si a Trattato Lisbona, http://news.excite.it/politica/565190/Ue-Senato-si-a-Trattato-Lisbona
Antonio Villafranca, Il Trattato di Lisbona: fine di una crisi? Paper of ISPI, ottobre 2007, No. 63, http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/pb_63_2007.pdf
[1] 本文是發表於2009年1月17日的「歐洲聯盟在全球化下的角色：機會與挑戰」研討會。作者
感謝淡江歐研所郭秋慶教授所給的寶貴建議。
[2] 瑞典議會周四經過馬拉松式的長時間辯論後，以243票贊成、39票反對、67票棄權或缺席，即三分之二的絕對多數票確認了《里斯本條約》。除聯合執政的4個政黨外，瑞典第一大反對黨社會民主黨的議員也大都投了贊成票。「瑞典議會確認里斯本條約」，明報，2008年11月21日請參閱以下網址：<>.
[3] 捷克參議院當天以多數票通過了這一決定。在前一天，由於公民民主黨、捷克和摩拉維亞共產黨議員的反對，捷克眾議院在九日召開的特別會議上未能就批准里斯本條約問題達成一致，故而決定在二００九年二月三日重新討論批准此條約的問題。其實捷克憲法法院早於去年十一月二十六日在布爾諾市作出裁決，明言里斯本條約不違背捷克憲法。這一裁決為捷克議會討論里斯本條約清除了法律障礙。「捷克參眾兩院決定推遲審議里斯本」，新華網，<>.捷克憲法法院裁定里斯本條約不違背捷克憲法後克勞斯二十五日在布爾諾憲法法院表示，如果通過里斯本條約，將會改變捷克共和國的國際地位，進而削弱捷克的主權。
[4] 此制度要求，只有代表55%以上的成員國和同時代表不少於65%歐盟人口的投票率才能通過決議。
[5] 「歐盟里斯本條約波蘭拒簽」，聯合報，2008.07.02, 請參閱以下網址：
[6] 「波蘭總統180度改變立場：支持里斯本條約」，中國評論新聞網， 2008-07-17，請參閱以下網址：< coluid="7&kindid="0&docid="100697591">.
[7] 廖福特，挫折產生猶豫，杯葛造成污名 歐盟與台灣公民投票之省思，新世紀智庫論壇，第四十一期，（民國九十七年三月三十），請參閱以下網址：
[8] 周劭彥︰歐盟還需要里斯本條約嗎？Taiwan News財經文化周刊，請參閱以下網址：
[9] 歐盟透過「里斯本條約」的政經內涵，行政院經濟建設委員會，請參閱以下網址：
[10] Roberto Adam e Antonio Tizzano, Lineamenti Di Diritto Dell’Unione Europea (Torino: G. Giappichelli Editore, 2008), p. 85.
[11] Luigi Daniele, Diritto Dell’Unione Europea: Sistema Istituzionale-Ordinamento, Tutela Giurisdizionale- Competenze (Milano: Giaffre’ Editore, Terza edizione, 2008), pp. 18-19.
[12] Pierangelo Isernia, “Italian Mass Support for European Integration in the Formative Years,” European Journal of Political Research, Vol 47, Issue 3, 2007, pp. 383 - 410. Nicolò Conti and Luca Verzichelli (2004). “La dimensione europea del discorso politico in Italia: Un’Analisi diacronica delle preferenze partitiche (1950-2001)” In Maurizio Cotta, Pierangelo Isernia and Luca Verzichelli (eds.). L’Europa in Italia. Bologna, Il Mulino: pp. 55-76.
[13] Giuliano Amato, “Dalla convenzione al trattato di Lisbona,”Rivistadi Studi Politici Internazionali, Vol. 297, No. 1 Gennaio-Marzo 2008, pp. 110-115.
[14] 眾議院中僅有重建共黨的八票反對與其他兩票棄權。E. Caiano, “Polo e Ulivo uniti, via libera al governo sull’Europa,” Corriere della Sera, 29 novembre 2001, p. 11.
[15] 貝魯斯科尼的義大利前進黨(Forza Italia)是於1993年12月臨時成軍加入1994年的大選。參閱Piero Ignazi, Partiti politici in Italia: Da Forza Italia al Partito democratico (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), pp. 60-61. 波西的北方聯盟則成立於1983年。參閱Piero Ignazi, Partiti politici in Italia: Da Forza Italia al Partito democratico, (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), pp. 82-83. James L. Newell, Parties and Democracy in Italy (Vermont: Ashgate, 2000), pp. 83-87.
[16] Romano Prodi, La mia vision dei fatti: Cinque anni di governo in Europa (Bologna: il Mulino, 2008), pp. 7-20.
[17] Maurizio Cotta, “Berlusconi alla seconda prova di governo,” in Paolo Bellucci e Martin Bull (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: il Mulino, 2001 ), pp. 161-184.; Maurizio Cotta e Luca Verzichelli. IL governo Berlusconi Ⅱ alla prova, in Jean Blondel e Paolo Segatti (ed.), Politica in Italia: i fatti dell’anno e le interpretazioni (Bologna: iL Mulino, 2003), pp. 49-71.;Roberto Aliboni, “La politica estera del governo Berlusconi,” in Alessandro Colombo Natalino Ronzitti (ed.), L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), pp. 81-91.
[18] Elisabetta Brighi, “La politica estera dell’Italia,” in Alessandro Colombo and Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2006), pp. 99-104. Elisabetta Brighi, “One Man Alone?: A ongue duree Approch to Italy’s Foreign Policy Under Berlusconi,” Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2006, pp. 278-297.
[19] 內閣部長中，北方聯盟黨魁波西、國防部長馬堤諾(Antonio Martino)與經濟部長特列蒙帝(Giulio Tremonti)強烈質疑歐盟的作用。Lucia Serena Rossi, “Le posizioni dell’Italia sul futuro dell’Unione europea,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2002), pp. 79-90.
[20] 張孟仁，「義大利外交政策的改變與持續：第二任貝魯斯科尼政府(2001-2006)」，歐洲國際評論，第四期（民國九十七年六月），頁45-84。
[21] Ettore Greco e Raffaello Matarazzo, “La Convenzione Europea e il dibattito in Italia sul futuro dell’Ue,” in Alessandro Colombo e Natalino Ronzitti, ed., L’Italia e la politica internazionale (Bologna: il Mulino, 2003), pp. 119-130.
[22] 貝魯斯科尼恰為歐盟當時的輪值主席，為求任內功勳，曾誇下海口說義大利要成為第一個通
過歐洲憲法的國家。Ibid, p. 125.
[23] Italy’s Senate approves EU treaty, EU Business, 23 July 2008,
[24] Il trattato di Lisbona in crisi. Il Leader leghista scettico, il corriere della sera, 14 giugno 2008, <>. “Trattato di Lisbona, l'Italia ratifica la Camera approva all'unanimita,’ La Repubblica, 31 luglio 2008.
[25] UE: Si a Trattato Lisbona,
[26] Trattato Ue, Frattini blocca la Lega. Corriere della Sera, 16 Giugno 2008, 參見
[27] Berlusconi “Si’ al Trattato” Ma Lega insiste: Referendum,” La Repubblica, 19 giugno 2008, 參閱
[28] “Trattato Ue, La Lega apre Bossi: Lo voteremo anche noi,” il Corriere della sera, 19 giugno 2008,
參見
[29] Antonio Villafranca, Il Trattato di Lisbona: fine di una crisi? Paper of ISPI, ottobre 2007, No. 63,
[30] “Italy's Senate approves EU treaty,” EU business, 23 July 2008, 參見
[31] Il Governo Italiano, “Ratifica dell’Italia del Trattato di Lisbona,” <>.
[32] Tremonti: da la Iranda segnale di paura, Corriere della Sera, 14 Giugno 2008, 參見<>.
[33] 原本是義大利共產黨(Partito Communista Italiano)，1991年因蘇聯解體轉型更名為左派民主黨(Partito Democratico della Sinistra)。2007年人民黨與PPI/Margherita Margherita與左派民主黨PDS/DS合併並更名為民主黨(il Partito Democratico)。參閱 Andrea Di Michele, Storia dell’Italia repubblicana (1948-2008) (Milano: Garzanti, 2008), pp. 396-398.
[34] “Ue, "No" Irlanda spacca il governo Il premier ai ministri: "Preoccupato,” La Repubblica, 13 giugno 2008
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